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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703:  
THE BACK DOOR AND THE CONFRONTATION 




Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows experts to form opinions using 
information that is not admitted at trial, and even on evidence that is 
inadmissible.  In 2000, Rule 703 was amended to emphasize that it did not 
serve as an exception to the other rules of evidence.  When experts rely on 
inadmissible evidence, the evidence can only be disclosed for the limited 
purpose of assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion, and only if the 
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
effect.  This Note reviews the application of Rule 703 before and after the 
2000 amendment.  It finds that disclosure of inadmissible evidence should 
still be expected in a substantial number of cases, but nevertheless 
concludes that the compromise approach struck by amended Rule 703 is 
largely correct.  Courts should, however, weigh the strong possibility that 
limiting instructions under Rule 703 will often be ineffective (and logically 
impossible), and reduce disclosure accordingly. 
This Note also considers Rule 703’s intersection with recent changes in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  It argues 
that, although Rule 703 allows expert reliance on inadmissible evidence, 
the compromises struck by Rule 703 should not be allowed to mask 
Confrontation Clause violations.  Expert disclosure of testimonial hearsay 
basis evidence should be understood as a Confrontation Clause violation.  
Evaluating the expert’s testimony to see if it includes an independent 
opinion, as suggested in some recent opinions, does not solve the problem.  
An expert can both provide an independent opinion and convey testimonial 
hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Expert” testimony on a multitude of topics appears in modern civil and 
criminal trials.1  An engineer might provide an opinion on the operation of 
equipment at a manufacturing plant.2  A doctor might opine about a 
person’s physical and mental competence to enter into an agreement.3  In a 
lawsuit over insurance, an expert might testify that a house fire was 
deliberate, not accidental.4  Or, in a criminal prosecution, a police officer 
might testify as a “gang expert” to provide information about the 
background of a gang, or to translate gang code words for the jury.5
Experts can obtain the information that underlies their opinions from 
many sources.  A doctor, for example, can develop specialized medical 
knowledge by learning from teachers and colleagues during and after 
medical school, by gaining practical experience treating patients, and by 
reading medical journals and treatises.
 
6  The doctor can also rely on a 
variety of sources to obtain information about a specific patient.  The doctor 
might obtain information from personal observation of the patient, from the 
patient’s own description of his condition, from the patient’s family, from 
other medical professionals, and from medical records.7  In the context of a 
lawsuit, the doctor might also obtain information from the patient’s lawyer, 
from legal documents, and by observing the trial itself.8
An expert in practice can thus rely on a variety of information.  The rules 





 1. Concern over expert testimony is not a modern phenomenon, however.  Learned 
Hand criticized expert testimony in a 1901 Harvard Law Review article. See generally 
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901). 
  If an expert provides an opinion at trial, should the expert be allowed 
to rely on all of the information that she would in practice, or should the 
expert be allowed to rely on only the information that the jury can hear?  An 
expert’s background knowledge that forms the basis of her expertise may 
present an unavoidable problem.  The expert is useful precisely because of 
 2. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 
1997) (describing the testimony of a mechanical engineer called to offer an opinion on the 
operation of a tank in a manufacturing plant). 
 3. United States v. Zandford, 110 F.3d 62, No. 95-5816, 1997 WL 153822, at *3 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (describing the expert testimony of a neurologist and 
general physician). 
 4. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 611–13 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing 
the expert testimony of a fire marshal that a fire was set deliberately). 
 5. United States v. Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2006) (describing the 
qualifications and testimony of a federal agent called as an expert witness). 
 6. See Paul D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473, 
478–88 (1962) (describing the sources of general knowledge underlying a medical expert’s 
opinion). 
 7. See id. at 488–514 (describing a medical expert’s possible firsthand and secondhand 
sources of particular knowledge about an individual before trial). 
 8. See id. at 514–26 (describing possible legal sources that could supply a medical 
expert with knowledge about a particular case). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note (“Not all relevant evidence is 
admissible.  The exclusion of relevant evidence occurs in a variety of situations . . . .”). 
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her expertise, which may be impossible for the jury to acquire through 
education at trial,10 and which the expert acquired without the rules of 
evidence in mind.11  To gain the benefit of expert testimony, the legal 
system must recognize that knowledge.12
The case-specific information that an expert might use, however, presents 
greater problems.  If the rules of evidence or other considerations
 
13
The common law restricted the structure of expert testimony and the 
sources of information upon which experts could rely.
 have 
kept that information from the jury, should an expert be allowed to rely on 
such information to form an opinion to be presented at trial?  If the expert 
does rely on such evidence to form an opinion, should the expert be allowed 
to disclose this “inadmissible basis evidence” to the jury? 
14  With limited 
exceptions, the common law required experts to base their opinions on 
information admissible at trial, which the experts could obtain at trial or 
from their own observations outside of court.15  The common law strictures 
ensured, in theory, that the jury knew the factual underpinnings of the 
expert’s opinion and could accept or reject the opinion accordingly:  “[A] 
juror should be able to say, ‘My conclusion is in accord with the opinion of 
the expert, not because he has expressed the opinion, but because he made 
me understand the facts in such a way that my opinion is the same as 
his.’”16
The Federal Rules of Evidence loosened the common law restrictions on 
expert testimony so that the information experts relied on to provide 
opinions for trial could more closely correspond to the information they 
would have relied on in practice (outside of court).
 
17  In particular, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 703 allowed experts to rely on information that would not 
be admissible at trial.18
Rule 703 left open the question of whether an expert could disclose 
inadmissible basis evidence to the jury.  Commentators advocated a variety 
 
 
 10. See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:  
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1993) (“Experts are often expert 
because of years of specialized training, and thus there may be formidable barriers to 
educating the fact finder about the relevant issues at trial.”). 
 11. See Rheingold, supra note 6, at 478–88. 
 12. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE:  EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.1 (2010) 
(explaining that we accept that an expert’s background knowledge is necessarily based on 
hearsay). 
 13. “The exclusion of relevant evidence . . . may be called for by [the Federal Rules of 
Evidence], by the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, by Bankruptcy Rules, by Act of 
Congress, or by constitutional considerations.” FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note. 
 14. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 15. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 16. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 428 (1952). 
 17. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he rule is designed to broaden the 
basis for expert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial 
practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.”). 
 18. FED. R. EVID. 703 (“If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”). 
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of approaches.19  One approach feared the use of experts as “conduits” or a 
“back door” through which parties could put inadmissible evidence before 
the jury.20  This approach would have prevented the expert from discussing 
the inadmissible basis evidence in any detail.21  An opposing approach 
argued that information relied on by experts should be disclosed to the jury 
for substantive consideration.22  A third approach, charting a middle course 
that tended to be followed by courts,23 argued that inadmissible basis 
evidence should be disclosed to the jury for the limited purpose of 
explaining the expert’s opinion, subject to an evaluation of the probative 
value and prejudicial effect of the evidence under Rule 403.24
In 2000, Rule 703 was amended to confirm that courts should take an 
approach along the lines of this middle course.
 
25  Amended Rule 703 
clarified that Rule 703 did not function as an exception through which 
otherwise inadmissible evidence could be admitted.26  It also created a 
presumption that the jury should not hear inadmissible basis evidence relied 
on by an expert.27  Under amended Rule 703, inadmissible basis evidence 
that an expert has relied on can be disclosed to the jury for the limited 
purpose of assisting the jury’s evaluation of the expert’s opinion, but only if 
the probative value of the evidence “substantially outweighs” the 
prejudicial effect of disclosure to the jury.28  Rule 703 thus reverses the 
default presumption of disclosure under Rule 403 to create a presumption 
against disclosure even for the limited purpose of explaining the expert’s 
opinion.29




 19. See infra Part I.B.3. 
  This 
Note revisits the controversy leading to the amendment and examines the 
 20. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits:  Confrontation Abuses in Opinion 
Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 859–66 (1992) (describing “the problem of backdoor 
hearsay through expert opinion”). 
 21. See infra Part I.B.3.a. 
 22. See infra Part I.B.3.b. 
 23. See Allen & Miller, supra note 10, at 1135 (describing “the current practice of the 
courts of admitting the underlying data for the purpose of appraising the opinion”). 
 24. See infra Part I.B.3.c.  According to Rule 403, “Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 25. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment.  This Note uses 
the text of the rules as currently in force at the time of publication.  On December 1, 2011, 
barring congressional action to the contrary, restyled rules will go into effect.  The restyling 
was designed to be non-substantive, and thus should not impact case law precedent or the 
analysis in this Note. See Federal Rules of Evidence—2011 Pending Amendment to Restyle 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. EVIDENCE REVIEW, 
http://federalevidence.com/node/1051 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Compare id. (“Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be 
disclosed . . . unless . . . their probative value . . . substantially outweighs their prejudicial 
effect.”), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (“[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”). 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment. 
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application of amended Rule 703.  Part I of this Note discusses the 
evolution of the rules governing disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence, 
from the common law to amended Rule 703.  Part II discusses the 
application of amended Rule 703 in the courts, including the effect of the 
amendment to Rule 703 in closing a back door to inadmissible evidence.  
As discussed in Part II, the amendment to the Rule may have curbed 
disclosure of inadmissible evidence to some degree, but disclosure can still 
be expected in a substantial number of cases.  Part II also addresses the 
implications of recent changes in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence for 
the treatment of inadmissible basis evidence.  Part III discusses Rule 703 in 
view of experience under the amended Rule, and concludes that Rule 703 
struck an appropriate compromise, but that courts should place additional 
emphasis on the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions under the Rule.  
The approaches taken in Rule 703 should not, however, be allowed to 
obscure Confrontation Clause problems inherent in some expert testimony. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703 
This part discusses the background and evolution of Rule 703.  Part I.A 
addresses the common law background of Rule 703 and Rule 703’s 
broadening of the common law restrictions on the permissible bases of 
expert testimony.  Part I.B discusses approaches for treating disclosure of 
inadmissible basis evidence under Rule 703.  Part I.C addresses the 2000 
amendment to Rule 703. 
A.  The Permissible Bases and Form of Expert Testimony Under the 
Common Law and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Expert testimony can be understood as having a syllogistic structure.31  
An expert applies specialized knowledge (the major premise) to information 
specific to the case at hand (the minor premise) to reach a conclusion.32  
For example, a physician might testify that the plaintiff in a personal injury 
action had a brain injury.33  The physician’s major premise could be that the 
presence of particular symptoms A, B, and C indicates brain injury D.34  
The plaintiff’s actual symptoms would form the physician’s minor 
premise.35  For example, assume the plaintiff exhibited symptoms A, B, and 
C.  By applying the major premise to the minor premise, the expert could 
conclude that the plaintiff suffered from brain injury D.36  Both the major 
and minor premises implicate inadmissible basis evidence.37
 
 31. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The ‘Bases’ of Expert Testimony:  The Syllogistic 
Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988); see also Julie A. Seaman, 
Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay:  The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion 
Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 837 n.38 (2008) (“Professor Imwinkelried’s syllogistic 
framework remains the most helpful way of thinking about this process.”). 
  This Note 
 32. See Imwinkelried, supra note 31, at 2–3. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See infra notes 39–58 and accompanying text. 
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focuses on the minor premise, the case-specific data that an expert has 
relied on in forming an opinion.  Common law rules strictly regulated the 
case-specific evidence underlying expert opinions.38
1.  Restrictions on the Bases and Form of Expert Testimony 
at Common Law 
  The Federal Rules of 
Evidence loosened these restrictions, as will be discussed in Part I.A.2. 
At common law, much of the information that an expert might rely on 
was inadmissible hearsay.39  Expertise developed through firsthand 
practical experience presented little problem,40 but the majority rule at the 
end of the nineteenth century held “that standard medical and scientific 
works are inadmissible in evidence as proof of the declarations or opinions 
which they contain.”41  Thus, to the extent that the expert learned from 
others or by reading, the expert had relied on hearsay.42  Nevertheless, the 
common law recognized that experts frequently acquired their knowledge 
from hearsay, and that “to reject a professional physician or mathematician 
because the fact or some facts to which he testifies are known to him only 
upon the authority of others would be to ignore the accepted methods of 
professional work and to insist on finical and impossible standards.”43
The expert’s case-specific knowledge, however, presented a greater 
problem.  The common law restricted both the sources of case-specific 
information on which an expert could permissibly rely and the form of the 
expert’s testimony at trial.
  
Thus, the common law accepted that an expert’s general knowledge often 
came from inadmissible evidence. 
44
 
 38. See infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text. 
  These rules sought to ensure that the expert 
relied only on admissible evidence and that the jury knew the basis of the 
 39. See Daniel D. Blinka, “Practical Inconvenience” or Conceptual Confusion:  The 
Common-Law Genesis of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 467, 484, 
488 (1997).  As currently defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is “a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c).  The definition of 
hearsay in the Federal Rules reflects the common law understanding of hearsay. See 3 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1361 (2d ed. 1923). 
 40. Blinka, supra note 39, at 484. 
 41. HENRY WADE ROGERS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 166 (2d ed. 1891); see 
also FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee’s note (noting that “the great weight of 
authority has been that learned treatises are not admissible as substantive evidence though 
usable in the cross-examination of experts”); Blinka, supra note 39, at 485–87.  An 
exception existed for “books that relate[d] to the exact sciences,” or that by longstanding use 
had become widely recognized as the type of authority that people relied on to govern their 
lives. ROGERS, supra, § 163. This exception permitted admission in evidence of “almanacs, 
astronomical calculations, tables of logarithms, mortuary tables for estimating the probable 
duration of life at a given age, tables of weights and measures, and of currency, 
chronological tables, interest tables, and annuity tables.” Id.; Blinka, supra note 39, at 485. 
 42. Blinka, supra note 39, at 484. 
 43. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 665; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5; 
ROGERS, supra note 41, §§ 19, 162; Blinka, supra note 39, at 485–87. 
 44. See Blinka, supra note 39, at 487–90. 
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expert’s testimony.45  As a result, the jury could (at least in theory) evaluate 
the basis of the expert’s testimony and accept or reject the expert’s opinion 
accordingly.46
More specifically, the common law generally limited the permissible 
case-specific bases of expert testimony to two sources.
 
47  First, the expert 
could testify based on the expert’s personal observations.48  Second, the 
expert could testify based on information admitted at trial.49  The expert 
could obtain this information by attending the trial and listening to the same 
information as the jury.50  Alternatively, and more commonly, the expert 
could be presented with the information in a hypothetical question at trial.51  
The expert was not limited to one source of information or the other:  an 
expert who had knowledge obtained by personal observation could also 
learn additional facts at trial.52
Limited exceptions allowed experts to rely on certain inadmissible case-
specific information, and to disclose the information to the jury.
 
53  Experts 
on the valuation of property were permitted to rely on inadmissible hearsay 
such as evidence of price lists or comparable sales.54  This exception 
allowed courts to use information that experts commonly relied on outside 
of court, without imposing unnecessary costs on the court and the parties.  
In addition, a treating physician was permitted to rely on his patient’s 
description of his condition.55
 
 45. See id. 
  As Dean John Henry Wigmore pointed out, 
 46. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.4, at 151 (noting that the hypothetical question, 
which was required in certain circumstances at common law, in theory, “provided the jury 
with a clear exposition of the expert’s basis, so that it could decide whether to believe the 
premises and whether the expert’s conclusions properly followed from them”); Blinka, supra 
note 39, at 488 (“What good was the expert’s opinion, then, unless both the expert and the 
jury concurred in what was said or done in this specific case?”). 
 47. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 703.02[1] (9th ed. 2006). 
 48. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489; 
JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C. L. REV. 
53, 56–57 (1994).  For example, a doctor could present an opinion based on his firsthand 
examination of a patient. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (citing Rheingold, 
supra note 6, at 489). 
 49. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90; 
Epps, supra note 48, at 56–57.  For example, an expert providing an estimate of damages 
suffered by a plaintiff would rely on evidence admitted at trial, instead of personal 
observation. Epps, supra note 48, at 62. 
 50. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; SALTZBURG ET AL, supra note 47, 
§ 703.02[1]; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90; Epps, supra note 48, at 56–57. 
 51. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; SALTZBURG ET AL, supra note 47, 
§ 703.02[1]; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90; Epps, supra note 48, at 57 & n.20. 
 52. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 678. 
 53. KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5.1. 
 54. Id.; Epps, supra note 48, at 56 & n.19. 
 55. ROGERS, supra note 41, § 47; 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 688; Blinka, supra note 
39, at 496–98; Epps, supra note 48, at 56 & n.18.  The patient’s statements about his present 
physical condition for the purpose of treatment were at the core of the exception.  Statements 
by the patient to a non-treating physician and statements by the patient about his medical 
history or the cause of his condition were viewed less favorably. Blinka, supra note 39, at 
497–98. 
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“[T]he law cannot afford to stultify itself by refusing to recognize, in 
testimonial rules, the safe and accepted practices of medical science.”56  
The doctor relied on the patient’s statements in medical practice.  The law 
should not prevent the doctor from doing so at trial.57  Courts justified these 
exceptions by pointing to expert reliance on the information outside of 
court, efficiency, and the expert’s own validation of the information.58
The common law also limited the form of the expert’s testimony.  When 
the expert relied on personal observations, the rule at the end of the 
nineteenth century required the expert to disclose the observations before 
providing his opinion.
 
59  In addition, when the expert relied solely or partly 
on disputed information admitted at trial, common law rules required that 
the expert testify by answering a hypothetical question (or questions).60  
The hypothetical question was required to identify the premises of the 
expert’s opinion, which ensured that the opinion was based on admissible 
evidence,61 and also allowed the jury to evaluate the bases of the expert’s 
opinion.62  Hypothetical questions thus served important theoretical 
purposes.  In practice, however, they were “difficult for the attorneys to 
frame, for the court to rule on, and for the jury to understand.”63  
Hypothetical questions could be quite long and complex,64 and subject to 
bias.65
The Federal Rules of Evidence both broadened the permissible bases of 
expert testimony and loosened the common law strictures on the form of 
expert testimony, as discussed in the next section. 
 
2.  Broadening the Permitted Bases and Form of Expert Testimony 
by the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Building on the exceptions provided at common law,66 Federal Rule of 
Evidence 703 broadened the permissible bases of expert testimony.67  In 
addition, Rule 705 loosened common law restrictions on the form of expert 
testimony.68
 
 56. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 688, at 1097; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, 
§ 4.5.1. 
 
 57. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 688, at 1097–98; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, 
§ 4.5.1. 
 58. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5.1. 
 59. Blinka, supra note 39, at 489.  This requirement was largely left to the trial judge’s 
discretion by the middle of the twentieth century. Id. 
 60. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, §§ 676–78; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90. 
 61. Blinka, supra note 39, at 490. 
 62. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 680. 
 63. Ladd, supra note 16, at 425. 
 64. See, e.g., Barnes v. Marshall, 467 S.W.2d 70, 74 (Mo. 1971) (describing, in a case 
relating to a decedent’s testamentary capacity, a question that “hypothesized much of the 
evidence related by the other witnesses for plaintiff and utilize[d] ten pages of the 
transcript”).  One reported hypothetical question “extended over 83 pages of the reporter’s 
transcript.” Ladd, supra note 16, at 427 (citing Treadwell v. Nickel, 228 P. 25 (Cal. 1924)). 
 65. Ladd, supra note 16, at 427; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.4. 
 66. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5.1; supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 67. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note. 
 68. See FED. R. EVID. 705; FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note. 
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Rule 703, which addresses “[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference,”69 makes three possible 
sources of information available to an expert.70  The first two sources 
continue common law practices71:  under Rule 703, an expert can still 
permissibly base an opinion on firsthand observation and on information 
admitted at the proceeding.72  In addition, Rule 703 built on and broadened 
the permitted common law bases by adding a third source of information, 
“facts or data . . . made known to the expert . . . before the hearing.”73  
Under Rule 703, therefore, an expert can rely on information made known 
to her outside of the hearing other than by her own perception.74  In 
addition, Rule 703 provides that the evidence relied on by the expert need 
not be admissible if the evidence is of a type “reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the . . . field.”75 
The drafters justified these changes by pointing to rationales similar to 
those that justified the more limited common law exceptions:  the expert’s 
practice outside of court, efficiency, and the expert’s own validation of the 
evidence.76  A doctor in practice, for example, bases a diagnosis on 
information obtained from various sources.77  According to the advisory 
committee, much of this information would be admissible at trial, but only 
at the expense of judicial resources.78  Allowing a doctor serving as an 
expert to rely on such information—even if it is not admitted—“bring[s] the 
judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when 
not in court” and yields efficiency benefits.79  Indeed, the doctor in practice 
makes life and death decisions based on the information upon which she 
chooses to rely.  Therefore, an expert’s “validation, expertly performed and 
subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.”80  
Thus, with the adoption of Rule 703, an expert could rely on information 
that was not admitted at trial and even on information that was not 
admissible at trial.81
Rule 705, moreover, eliminated the requirement for the hypothetical 
question and freed the expert’s testimony from the common law rules 
 
 
 69. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 70. Id. advisory committee’s note.  Rule 703 provides, in relevant part, “The facts or 
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.” FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 71. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; see supra notes 47–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 72. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. advisory committee’s note (“The third source contemplated by the rule consists 
of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception.”). 
 75. FED. R. EVID. 703 (“If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”). 
 76. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 77. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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requiring that the jury be made aware of the expert’s premises.82  Under 
Rule 705, a party may—but is not required to—disclose the information 
underlying the expert’s opinion before providing the opinion.83  The 
opposing party may, however, inquire into the basis of the expert’s opinion 
on cross-examination, even if the basis is not disclosed by the proponent of 
the expert’s testimony.84
In combination, Rules 703 and 705 departed from the common law rules 
that generally sought to ensure that the expert relied only on admissible 
evidence and that the jury knew the basis of the expert’s testimony.
 
85  
Under Rules 703 and 705, the expert can rely on information inadmissible 
at trial, and the expert is not required to disclose the bases of his opinion to 
the jury.86
B.  Disclosure of Inadmissible Basis Evidence to the Jury Under Rule 703 
  Rules 703 and 705 as adopted, however, left open the important 
question of whether or not inadmissible basis evidence could be disclosed 
to the jury, and if so, for what purpose.  This question is addressed in the 
next section. 
Under Rule 703, “[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts 
or data [upon which the expert relies] need not be admissible in evidence in 
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”87  Rule 703 as originally 
implemented did not, however, address whether experts could disclose the 
information that they had relied on to the jury if the information was not 
admissible.88  This omission from the Rule gave rise to disagreement about 
the proper treatment of such evidence, and to concern that expert testimony 
could be used to improperly place inadmissible evidence before the jury.89
Part I.B.1 discusses what kinds of inadmissible evidence might be 
disclosed under Rule 703.  Part I.B.2 discusses options for addressing 
whether, and to what extent, inadmissible basis evidence may be disclosed 
to the jury.  Part I.B.3 discusses conflicting approaches advocated by 
commentators in the years leading up to the amendment to the Rule in 
2000.  And Part I.B.4 identifies the approaches to disclosing inadmissible 
basis evidence taken by the courts. 
 
 
 82. FED. R. EVID. 705 (“The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give 
reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court 
requires otherwise.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (“The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data 
on cross-examination.”). 
 85. See supra notes 44–65 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra notes 66–84 and accompanying text. 
 87. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 88. See id. advisory committee’s note. 
 89. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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1.  What Inadmissible Evidence Might Be Disclosed? 
The debate surrounding consideration and disclosure of inadmissible 
evidence by experts has focused primarily on hearsay.90  When an expert 
relies on a statement made by a person outside of the courtroom, the jury 
cannot fully evaluate the reliability of the statement.91  Instead, the jury 
must rely on the expert’s evaluation.92  An out-of-court statement is not 
hearsay merely because it is repeated in court, however.  Instead, as defined 
by Rule 801(c), “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.”93  Thus, if an expert in court repeats 
an out-of-court statement, but not for the purpose of proving the truth of the 
subject matter asserted in the statement, the statement is not hearsay.94
Nevertheless, Rule 703 does not limit inadmissible basis evidence to 
hearsay.
  This 
distinction, and whether it is tenable in this context, is discussed further in 
the following sections. 
95  Experts may also rely on information rendered inadmissible for 
other reasons, including other rules of evidence and the Constitution.96
In United States v. W.R. Grace,
  
Moreover, hearsay and the Constitution intersect in an important 
Confrontation Clause problem discussed in Part III. 
97 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the district court erred by precluding experts from relying on information 
that had been excluded under Rule 403, without considering whether 
experts could reasonably rely on the information under Rule 703.98  
Information that the district court had determined to be “unreliable, 
irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial” could nevertheless be relied on by an 
expert if the other requirements for expert testimony—including 
“reasonabl[e] reli[ance]” under Rule 703—were satisfied.99
 
 90. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; supra notes 39–58. 
 
 91. The value of a witness’s testimony depends on the quality of the witness’s 
perception, memory, and narration of the subject matter of the testimony, as well as the 
witness’s sincerity in testifying. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note.  To 
test these factors, the witness should preferably testify under oath, before the factfinder, and 
subject to cross-examination. See id. (discussing hearsay).  When an expert relays a 
statement by an out-of-court speaker, these conditions are not met and the jury cannot fully 
evaluate the speaker. Cf. id. 
 92. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (arguing, although not in the 
context of disclosure, that expert validation of basis evidence should allow the expert to rely 
on the evidence in forming an opinion). 
 93. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (emphasis added).  As used in the Rule, “statement” is broader 
than the lay concept of a statement.  The concept of “statement” for hearsay purposes 
includes oral and written assertions, as well as nonverbal conduct that is intended as an 
assertion. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 94. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 95. See FED. R. EVID. 703; id. advisory committee’s note; Blinka, supra note 39, at 535. 
 96. See FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note. 
 97. 504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007).  For the text of Rule 403, see supra note 24. 
 98. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d. at 758, 760–61, 763, 766. 
 99. Id. 
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Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.100 addressed the admissibility 
evidence of “other accidents,” which is admissible under Rule 404(b) in 
product liability actions for certain purposes if the other accidents were 
sufficiently similar to the accident at issue.101  In Nachtsheim, the court 
affirmed a district court’s ruling that the “other accident” evidence was 
inadmissible.102  The plaintiffs also attempted to argue that the evidence 
that another accident had occurred should have been admissible under Rule 
703 through their expert witness, but were unsuccessful.103
In Pineda v. Ford Motor Co.,
 
104 the Third Circuit explained that “[t]he 
District Court and the parties [had] conflate[d] the separate issues of 
whether [a “Safety Recall Instruction” (SRI)] itself can be admitted into 
evidence and whether [the expert’s] opinion can be admitted if it is based 
on a consideration of the SRI.”105  While the SRI might be inadmissible as 
a subsequent remedial measure under Rule 407, the expert could 
nevertheless rely on the SRI in forming his opinion.106  The court left open 
the possibility that the expert could disclose his reliance on the SRI to the 
jury.107
In Anderson v. Terhune,
 
108 a convicted prisoner seeking habeas relief 
unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on several grounds, including 
that a juror slept during his trial.109  Juror testimony and affidavits 
concerning the sleeping juror were inadmissible under Rule 606(b).110
 
 100. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988). 
  But 
 101. Id. at 1268–70; Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 
703, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1253 (2007) (describing Nachtsheim and characterizing 
“other accident” evidence as falling under Rule 404(b)).  Rule 404(b) provides, “Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 102. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1269–70. 
 103. Id. at 1270 n.11.  For another example, see Peters v. Nissan Forklift Corp., No. 06-
2880, 2008 WL 2625522, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2008) (order granting defendant’s 
motion in limine), in which the court permitted the plaintiff’s expert to rely on inadmissible 
“other accident” evidence if the reasonable reliance requirement of Rule 703 was satisfied, 
but prevented disclosure of the evidence to the jury. 
 104. 520 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 105. Id. at 246–47. 
 106. Id. at 242, 246–47.  Rule 407 provides in part that “evidence of . . . subsequent 
[remedial] measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a 
product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction.” FED. R. EVID. 
407. But see Robenhorst v. Dematic Corp., No. 05 C 3192, 2008 WL 1821519, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 22, 2008) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion in limine) 
(“Because Rule 407 prohibits the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
to prove ‘a defect in a product’ or ‘a defect in a product’s design,’ plaintiff’s expert cannot 
rely on the post-accident modifications as a basis for his opinion.”).  Although the court in 
Robenhorst barred expert reliance altogether, it quoted the final sentence of Rule 703 (which 
only addresses disclosure of otherwise inadmissible basis evidence to the jury) as support for 
its decision. Id. 
 107. Pineda, 520 F.3d at 247 n.14. 
 108. 409 F. App’x 175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 109. Id. at 178–79. 
 110. Id. 
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the prisoner successfully introduced an expert report that relied on the 
inadmissible juror testimony, because the expert could permissibly rely on 
inadmissible evidence under Rule 703.111
Thus, under Rule 703, an expert can rely on information that would be 
inadmissible under various other rules.  Significantly, an expert might also 
rely on information that would violate provisions of the Constitution if 
introduced at trial.  Expert reliance on hearsay that would violate the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is discussed in Part III.  
Other possibilities include expert reliance on information obtained in 
violation of a defendant’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights.
 
112
Expert reliance on inadmissible information risks frustrating the policies 
behind the Rules of Evidence or violating the protections offered by the 
Constitution, particularly if the expert is allowed to disclose the 
inadmissible information to the jury.
 
113
2.  Evaluative Use, Substantive Use, and Limiting Instructions 
  The next sections discuss ways of 
addressing the issue of disclosure. 
Inadmissible basis evidence could be handled in a variety of ways.  The 
expert could be prohibited from referring to inadmissible basis evidence at 
all.114  Or, the expert could be permitted to refer to the inadmissible basis 
evidence only in general terms.115  Alternatively, the expert could be 
permitted to disclose the inadmissible evidence to the jury, but only for the 
limited purpose of evaluating the expert’s testimony (evaluative use).116  
Finally, the expert could be permitted to disclose the inadmissible evidence 
to the jury, and the jury could be permitted to use the basis evidence for 
substantive purposes (substantive use).117
Moreover, inadmissible basis evidence need not be always admissible or 
always inadmissible (whether substantively or for a more limited use) under 
Rule 703.  The evidence could be admitted under some circumstances and 
excluded in others.  For example, inadmissible basis evidence could be 
 
 
 111. Id. at 178–79, 179 n.4. 
 112. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6, at 158 (discussing issues raised by expert 
reliance on information obtained in “violation of the Confrontation Clause or the privilege 
against self-incrimination, or as the product of an illegal search or seizure”). 
 113. See Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, No. CIV97-4014, 1998 WL 2017925, at 
*4 (D.S.D. Sept. 17, 1998) (order denying defendant’s motion for new trial) (“Rule 703 
ought not be used by a party to eviscerate the public policy purposes of Rules 407 
(subsequent remedial measures), 408 (offers to compromise), 409 (payment of expenses), or 
411 (liability insurance) . . . .”); KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6, at 158 (arguing that even 
expert reliance on information that is inadmissible for constitutional reasons may pose 
problems); Blinka, supra note 101, at 1249–54 (describing lawyers’ use or attempted use of 
Rule 703 to circumvent other rules of evidence, including the rule against hearsay). 
 114. See Blinka, supra note 39, at 553 (citing State v. Weber, 496 N.W.2d 762, 766 n.6 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 115. See infra Part I.B.3.a. 
 116. See infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 117. See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.B.3.b. 
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admitted for an evaluative use or substantive use subject to some 
determination of reliability or balancing of value and harm by the court.118
The evaluative use of basis evidence can be difficult to distinguish from 
the substantive use.  For example, in diagnosing a patient, a first doctor 
might rely on a statement from a second doctor that the patient showed 
symptom X.  In testifying as an expert, the first doctor might tell the jury 
that she relied on the second doctor’s statement.  If the basis evidence (the 
second doctor’s statement) is admitted for substantive purposes, then both 
the proponent of the expert and the jury are permitted to consider the 
second doctor’s statement as evidence that the patient did, in fact, have 
symptom X.  To alter an example given by Judge Richard Posner, “
 
If for 
example the expert witness (call him A) bases his opinion in part on a fact 
(call it X) that the party’s lawyer told him, the lawyer [would] in closing 
argument tell the jury, ‘See, we proved X through our expert witness, 
A.’”119  This approach would render the basis evidence admissible despite 
the rest of the rules of evidence.120  In this example, the basis evidence 
would be admissible despite the rule against hearsay, because the jury 
would be permitted to consider the out of court statement as proof of what 
the statement asserted (that the patient had symptom X).121 
If, on the other hand, the basis evidence is admitted only for the limited 
purpose of evaluating the expert’s testimony, the expert’s proponent and the 
jury cannot use the basis evidence for its prohibited use (for the truth of the 
statement made by the hearsay declarant, in this case), but they can use the 
testimony for its permitted use (evaluating the expert’s testimony).  The 
proponent of the expert thus cannot argue that she has proved a fact by 
pointing to inadmissible evidence that the expert relied on in forming an 
opinion.122  The jury can, however, use the basis evidence in considering 
whether the expert is credible.  To explain the prohibited and permitted uses 
of the evidence, a court might give the jury an instruction like the following 
one: 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury.  You have heard expert A testify that 
she relied on [describe statement] in arriving at her opinion.  You may 
consider this statement only in assessing the credibility of A’s opinion.  
You cannot use the statement as proof of [whatever is described in the 
statement] even though A herself used it for this purpose.123
 
 118. See infra Part I.B.3.c.  Ultimately, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 was amended in 
2000 to adopt an approach along these lines. See infra Part I.C. 
 
 119. In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir. 1992).  Actually, the 
Seventh Circuit in James Wilson Associates viewed the expert testimony as an attempt to 
circumvent the rule against hearsay. Id. at 172–73.  Correctly quoted, the Seventh Circuit 
explained, “If for example the expert witness (call him A) bases his opinion in part on a fact 
(call it X) that the party’s lawyer told him, the lawyer cannot in closing argument tell the 
jury, ‘See, we proved X through our expert witness, A.’” Id. at 173. 
 120. See Epps, supra note 48, at 64. 
 121. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 122. Blinka, supra note 39, at 548 n.460; see supra note 119. 
 123. Blinka, supra note 39, at 547–48. 
974 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
Limiting instructions like this one are used under the rules of evidence 
when evidence can be permissibly considered by the jury for one purpose 
but not for another.124
Limiting instructions have been roundly criticized.
 
125  Judge Learned 
Hand called a limiting instruction “the recommendation to the jury of a 
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s 
else.”126  Research also suggests that juries have difficulty following 
instructions on the law that they must apply.127 
Limiting instructions might be easier or harder for a jury to follow in 
different circumstances.128  One distinction that might be particularly hard 
to make is the one between using the case-specific hearsay information 
underlying an expert’s opinion for substantive purposes, and using it only to 
evaluate the expert’s opinion.  In evaluating the expert’s opinion, “one 
cannot accept an opinion as true without implicitly accepting the facts upon 
which the expert based that opinion.”129  The expert used the underlying 
evidence for its substance.  When a jury accepts an expert’s opinion, it is 
inherently accepting as true the facts upon which the expert has relied.130  
The jury is thus inherently accepting the underlying hearsay evidence for its 
truth.  However, a limiting instruction in this context tells the jury to use the 
hearsay evidence to evaluate the expert’s opinion but at the same time tells 
the jury not to consider the hearsay evidence for the truth of what the 
hearsay declarant asserted (even if the expert used the information that 
way).131  Such a distinction may be impossible.132
 
 124. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for 
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the 
court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
accordingly.”); Blinka, supra note 
 
39, at 528–34 (describing “limited admissibility” under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 125. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1235–36 (“Courts and commentators have had a 
veritable field day questioning, criticizing, and often condemning limiting instructions as 
applied in particular cases and in general.”) 
 126. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 127. Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear:  Dissecting 
the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 197–201 (2004) 
(summarizing research indicating that jurors have significant difficulty understanding jury 
instructions). 
 128. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1235–36; Blinka, supra note 39, at 532–33. 
 129. Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony:  A 
Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 585 (1987). 
 130. Id.; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.7.2 (arguing that the underlying 
evidence is only relevant if it is true, even if the jury only uses the evidence to evaluate the 
expert’s opinion). 
 131. Blinka, supra note 39, at 547.  According to Blinka, “Common sense alone exposes 
the absurdity of such instructions.” Id. 
 132. Id. (“What does it mean to tell the jury that the evidence is received solely as it bears 
on the weight to be given the expert’s opinion and then preclude them from using it in the 
same way that the expert did?”); see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.7.2 (arguing that 
the limiting instruction ignores the reality that evaluation of an expert’s opinion requires an 
evaluation of the truth of the underlying evidence). 
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Under Rule 105, moreover, a limiting instruction will be made upon 
request.133  A party may fail to request one, because of a failure to 
recognize the inadmissible evidence or perhaps because of a tactical 
decision not to highlight the inadmissible evidence.134  Rule 703 may thus 
provide a conduit to present otherwise inadmissible evidence unchallenged 
before the jury.135  On the other hand, questions of litigation tactics posed 
by limiting instructions is not limited to Rule 703, but rather extends 
throughout the rules of evidence.136 
When requested, limiting instructions hopefully educate the jury and 
prompt it at least to try to use evidence only for its permitted purpose.137  
Limiting the permissible use of expert basis evidence should also constrain 
the way that the court and parties refer to the information.138
If the jury cannot follow the limiting instruction, or if no limiting 
instruction is requested, however, then the evaluative use option disappears 
into substantive use.
 
139  That is, if the jury does not follow the limiting 
instruction, then the jury has used the basis evidence for its substance140 
(assuming that the jury uses the information at all).  In addition, if no 
limiting instruction is requested, then the jury will not know that the 
evidence can only be used for certain purposes.141
After the implementation of Rule 703, commentators presented various 
arguments for handling disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence.  These 
are addressed in the next section. 
 
3.  Advocacy for Conflicting Approaches for Treating Disclosure of 
Inadmissible Basis Evidence Under Rule 703 
After the implementation of Rule 703, commentators argued for several 
possible approaches to treating inadmissible basis evidence.  One 
possibility, discussed in Part I.B.3.a, would have limited experts to a 
general description of the sources of inadmissible information.  Another 
 
 133. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for 
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the 
court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
accordingly.”). 
 134. See Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 19 (2006) (“[A]ggrieved parties frequently forego limiting instructions for 
fear that they will only emphasize the damaging inference.”); Blinka, supra note 39, at 546 
(“[T]he opponent bears the burden of:  (1) timely recognizing that the expert’s basis is 
inadmissible for any number of reasons and (2) requesting a limiting instruction.” (citing 
Epps, supra note 48, at 72–73)). 
 135. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1249–54 (describing lawyers’ use or attempted use of 
Rule 703 to circumvent other rules of evidence, including the rule against hearsay). 
 136. See id. at 1229–46. 
 137. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1236; Blinka, supra note 39, at 532. 
 138. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text. 
 139. Allen & Miller, supra note 10, at 1134; Blinka, supra note 134, at 54. 
 140. Blinka, supra note 134, at 54 (explaining that under amended Rule 703, which 
provides for a limiting instruction, “absent an objection, the evidence is admitted for any 
relevant purposes thanks to the working of the waiver rule”); Epps, supra note 48, at 72–73 
(“The opponent . . . must shoulder the burden of asking for a limiting instruction.”). 
 141. See Blinka, supra note 134, at 54; Epps, supra note 48, at 72–73. 
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possibility, discussed in Part I.B.3.b, would have interpreted Rule 703 as 
making inadmissible hearsay admissible for substantive purposes.  A third 
approach, discussed in Part I.B.3.c, would have allowed consideration of 
inadmissible basis evidence for the limited purpose of evaluating the 
expert’s opinion, subject to the balancing test of Rule 403. 
a.  The Restrictive Approach 
At one end of the range of alternatives, Professor Ronald L. Carlson 
advocated an approach that would permit an expert on direct examination to 
refer only to the sources of evidence that he relied on, if the evidence was 
not otherwise admissible.142  He argued that permitting an expert to quote 
otherwise inadmissible evidence in court would violate the rule against 
hearsay.143  For example, if an expert relied on the opinions of three other 
experts and disclosed their opinions to the jury, the proponent of the 
testimony could effectively present the testimony of four experts to the jury, 
while having to produce (and subject to cross-examination) only one of 
them.144  Professor Carlson also contended that permitting an expert to 
disclose otherwise inadmissible basis evidence would “significantly 
damage[]” a criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.145  In 
particular, he feared that an expert’s testimony could be used as a back door 
or conduit through which the prosecution could introduce a statement 
without producing the speaker.146
Carlson therefore encouraged courts to make the “fine but important 
distinction between allowing an extra-record report to form a basis for 





 142. Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. 
REV. 577, 584–86 (1986) (“Once the expert identifies the sources for his conclusions during 
direct examination, the reference to outside material is complete.”); Carlson, supra note 
  This approach would not bar an expert from mentioning 
otherwise inadmissible basis evidence altogether.  Rather, Carlson would 
permit an expert to “identify and briefly describe” the evidence on direct 
20, 
at 869–71 (arguing that Rule 703 should be amended to limit the circumstances under which 
otherwise inadmissible basis evidence can be disclosed to the jury). 
 143. Carlson, supra note 142, at 584 (“To . . . allow the admission of an unauthenticated 
writing into evidence or to permit the testifying expert to quote extensively from that writing 
violates accepted hearsay norms.”). 
 144. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts, Judges, and Commentators:  The Underlying Debate 
About an Expert’s Underlying Data, 47 MERCER L. REV. 481, 482–83 (1996). 
 145. Ronald L. Carlson, In Defense of a Constitutional Theory of Experts, 87 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1182, 1184 (1993) (arguing that permitting the disclosure of inadmissible basis 
evidence “would decimate the tenets” of the Confrontation Clause); Carlson, supra note 142, 
at 585. 
 146. Carlson, supra note 20, at 859–64; Carlson, supra note 142, at 585 (“This back door 
introduction of the contents of a nontestifying expert’s report, without producing the author 
of the material, impinges on the criminal defendant’s sixth amendment rights.”). 
 147. Carlson, supra note 142, at 584; see also Carlson, supra note 20, at 866. 
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examination.148  In limited circumstances within the discretion of the court, 
more information might be admissible.149
According to Carlson, the details of otherwise inadmissible basis 
evidence should not be admitted even to help the jury evaluate the basis of 
the expert’s opinion.
 
150  He saw too much danger for misuse.151  The jury 
would be unable to see the distinction between use of the evidence for its 
substance and use of the evidence to explain the expert’s testimony:  “[I]t 
would be mythical to expect the jury simply to consider its illustrative 
effect and disregard its substantive content.”152  Carlson therefore 
characterized the attempt to admit otherwise inadmissible basis evidence for 
the purpose of explaining the expert’s testimony as a “subterfuge” that 
should not be permitted to circumvent the rule against hearsay.153
b.  The Open Approach 
 
At the other end of the range of alternatives, Professor Paul Rice 
responded to Professor Carlson by arguing that expert reliance should serve 
as a hearsay exception.154  He based his argument on the futility of limiting 
instructions, on the proper historical role for the expert as an assistant to—
not replacement for—the factfinder, and on the reliability of the evidence 
on which an expert relies.155
Like Professor Carlson,
 
156 Professor Rice found the distinction between 
using basis evidence for its substance or only to evaluate the expert’s 
opinion to be impossible.157  Allowing the expert to tell the jury what 
inadmissible evidence he has relied on, and then telling the jury to use the 
information only in evaluating the expert’s opinion—without accepting the 
evidence as true—requires “mental gymnastics” that jurors probably cannot 
perform.158  It is “schizophrenic and illogical.”159
 
 148. Carlson, supra note 
 
142, at 584. 
 149. Carlson, supra note 144, at 486 & n.34. 
 150. Carlson, supra note 144, at 484 (arguing that inadmissible basis evidence should not 
be admissible for the purposes of evaluating expert testimony); Carlson, supra note 145, at 
1183. 
 151. Carlson, supra note 144, at 484. 
 152. Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony:  Limitations on 
Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234, 245 n.44 (1984). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Rice, supra note 129, at 586. 
 155. Id. at 585–86. 
 156. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 157. Rice, supra note 129, at 584.  Rice interpreted Carlson’s position as supporting the 
use of otherwise inadmissible basis evidence for the limited purpose of evaluating the 
expert’s opinion. Id. (“If this practice sounds like judicial double talk, it is.  Professor 
Carlson, however, supports this result . . . .”).  Carlson later rejected this characterization. 
Carlson, supra note 145, at 1183 (“This is not correct.  I have consistently opposed the 
introduction of otherwise inadmissible background information whether offered directly or 
in the guise of justifying the expert’s opinion.”). 
 158. Rice, supra note 129, at 585; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 159. Id. at 586; see also supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
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From this position, Professor Rice took the opposite approach from 
Professor Carlson.  According to Rice, instead of hiding basis evidence 
from the jury unless it is independently admissible, the basis evidence 
should be disclosed to the jury in view of the proper role of the expert and 
the reliability of expert basis evidence.160  Rice argued that the proper role 
of the expert is to assist the jury.161  He pointed to the common law practice 
of presenting all of the case-specific evidence underlying the expert’s 
opinion to the jury, to allow the jury to accept or reject the opinion 
accordingly.162  According to Rice, preventing the jury from hearing and 
evaluating the facts underlying the expert’s opinion transforms the expert 
from an assistant to the factfinder into a “super-factfinder capable of 
producing admissible substantive evidence (an opinion) from inadmissible 
evidence.”163
To allow the jury to consider otherwise inadmissible basis evidence for 
its substance, Rule 703 must function as an exception to other exclusionary 
rules.  Professor Rice would have created a hearsay exception.
 
164
 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
  He 
suggested adding a new hearsay exception, Rule 803(5): 
 . . .  
 (5) Statement Employed in Expert Testimony.  A statement employed 
by an expert in arriving at a conclusion offered by that expert at trial, to 
the extent that (a) the statement is of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, and (b) the expert has demonstrated to [the] presiding judge a 
basis for concluding that the statement possesses substantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.165
Rice also proposed amending Rule 703 to make compliance with his 
proposed hearsay exception a prerequisite for expert reliance on 
inadmissible information.
 
166  Rice would further have prohibited expert 
reliance on evidence that was inadmissible for reasons “other than 
reliability,” if disclosure would frustrate the policies of the rule excluding 
the evidence.167
Rice’s disagreement with Carlson could be characterized as choosing a 
model that favors education of the jury over deference to an expert’s 
 
 
 160. Rice, supra note 129, at 585–86. 
 161. Id. at 586–87. 
 162. Id. at 587; see supra notes 45–46, 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 163. Rice, supra note 129, at 586–87. 
 164. Id. at 587.  Rice’s argument focuses on hearsay, but inadmissible basis evidence 
under Rule 703 is not limited to hearsay. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 165. Paul R. Rice, The Allure of the Illogic:  A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires 
More Than Redefining “Facts or Data,” 47 MERCER L. REV. 495, 506 (1996) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 166. Id. at 505 (describing a proposed Rule 703 that would require compliance with his 
proposed Rule 803(5) for information for which admissible proof was unavailable). 
 167. Id. 
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determination.168  If the expert does not at least disclose the important basis 
evidence underlying his opinion, the jury cannot “be[] informed and then 
convinced.”169  Instead, the jury must defer to the expert.170  On the other 
hand, if the court allows the expert to disclose both her specialized 
knowledge and the reasons for her opinion in the specific case, the jury can 
more fully consider the expert’s opinion and reasoning.171  However, 
allowing the expert to disclose inadmissible evidence to the jury may 
simply change where deference is required172:  instead of requiring the jury 
to defer to the expert’s opinion divorced from at least some of its basis, 
Rice’s position requires the jury to defer to the expert’s selection of the 
evidence and evaluation of its evidence.173  In the context of hearsay, 
Rice’s position would substitute the expert for the jury in evaluating 
hearsay statements.174
Rice saw little problem in allowing expert testimony to function as a 
hearsay exception.  According to Rice, if an expert relies on information of 
a type that experts in the field typically rely on as required by Rule 703,
 
175 
the expert has the expertise necessary to determine whether the evidence is 
reliable.176  Hearsay reasonably relied on by an expert is thus sufficiently 
reliable to be considered by the jury,177 which justified the hearsay 
exception.178  Rice also rejected Carlson’s Confrontation Clause 
concerns.179  Rice’s position, however, was based on earlier Supreme Court 
Confrontation Clause precedent, which focused on the reliability of the 
hearsay evidence in determining whether a confrontation was required.180
c.  The Middle Course 
 
A compromise approach, put forward in an article by Professor JoAnne 
Epps, rejected both Professor Carlson’s restrictive approach and Professor 
Rice’s open approach.181
 
 168. Allen & Miller, supra note 
  According to Professor Epps, if an expert 
reasonably relies on inadmissible facts or data in accordance with Rule 703, 
10, at 1134–38. 
 169. Id. at 1136. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1136–37. 
 172. See Seaman, supra note 31, at 860 (arguing that allowing the jury to rely on the 
expert’s evaluation of the basis evidence is no different from allowing the jury to rely on the 
expert’s opinion divorced from any support). 
 173. See id. at 859–60. 
 174. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 175. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 176. Rice, supra note 129, at 588. 
 177. Id.  Rice emphasized that the expert must reasonably rely on the information.  
Uncritical reliance would not suffice. Id. at 588–89. 
 178. Id. at 587–88 (arguing that the reasonable reliance standard of Rule 703 “satisfies the 
traditional test for exceptions to the hearsay rule:  that the circumstances of the out-of-court 
utterance adequately assure reliability in terms of both the accuracy of the declarant’s 
perception and memory and the sincerity with which the declarant recited what he perceived 
and remembered”). 
 179. Id. at 595. 
 180. Id. at 594–95; see infra notes 286–96 and accompanying text. 
 181. See Epps, supra note 48, at 70–74. 
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that inadmissible information should be disclosed to the jury, but only for 
the purpose of explaining and supporting the expert’s opinion.182  Professor 
Epps suggested two tiers of such information.  In the upper tier, 
“[i]nformation essential to the opinion should be presented to the jury, 
subject to Rule 403.”183  In the lower tier, information that the expert used 
but did not “need” should be subjected to a balancing test in which “the 
importance of the evidence to the jury [is balanced] against the likelihood 
that the jury will be improperly influenced by the evidence.”184  In fact, the 
upper tier may just represent a specific application of the lower tier.185  If 
the information is essential to the jury, it presumably passes Epps’s 
balancing test for less valuable information.186
Professor Epps reasoned that if an expert relies on a fact in forming an 
opinion, that fact ought to be disclosed to the jury, which is charged with 
evaluating the opinion.
 
187  The proponent of the expert should be able to 
paint a complete picture of the formation of the expert’s opinion, including 
both the admissible and inadmissible information upon which the expert 
relied.188  As long as the expert did in fact reasonably rely on the 
inadmissible information, a limiting instruction is given, and disclosure 
would not be too prejudicial, disclosure serves values of “truth-telling” and 
“fairness to the proponent.”189
Thus, like Professor Rice,
 
190 Professor Epps emphasized that the expert 
must have reasonably relied on the information to be disclosed to the 
jury.191  She advocated an active role for the trial judge in assessing the 
reasonableness of expert reliance on particular data.192  According to Epps, 
the assessment should go beyond assessing reliability or whether experts in 
the field regularly rely on a certain type of data, because regular practice in 
a field might be insufficiently rigorous, to assessing the reasonableness of 
reliance on information in the particular case.193
 
 182. Id. at 60.  Unlike Professor Carlson, see supra notes 
 
150–53 and accompanying text, 
and Professor Rice, see supra notes 129–30, 157–59 and accompanying text, Professor Epps 
did not express strong concerns about the use of limiting instructions, see Epps, supra note 
48, at 72–73. 
 183. Epps, supra note 48, at 84; see supra note 24 (reproducing the text of Rule 403). 
 184. Epps, supra note 48, at 84.  Epps suggested “unfair prejudice, confusion, and the 
inability to distinguish the limited value of the evidence” as examples of “improper[] 
influence[].” Id. at 84 & n.134. 
 185. Cf. id. at 84. 
 186. Cf. id. 
 187. Id. at 70–71, 84. 
 188. Id. at 71. 
 189. Id.  Epps also argued that the language of Rule 705 “would have been nonsensical 
unless it contemplated the routine disclosure of otherwise inadmissible facts or data 
underlying the expert’s opinion.” Id.  And she argued that that the broadening policy of Rule 
703, see supra Part I.A.2, and the general policy favoring admissibility of evidence under the 
Federal Rules, supported disclosure, see Epps, supra note 48, at 71–72. 
 190. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
 191. Epps, supra note 48, at 74–84. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
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4.  The Application of Pre-amendment Rule 703 in the Courts 
The application of Rule 703 in the courts varied, but across a narrower 
range than the varying approaches advocated by commentators.  The 
restrictive approach advocated by Professor Carlson was not widely 
adopted.194  In addition, no court is recognized as having held that Rule 703 
created a hearsay exception (or an exception to the other rules of 
evidence).195
Courts did, however, appear to disagree on the necessity of a limiting 
instruction.
 
196  According to the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 0.59 
Acres of Land,197 when an expert disclosed inadmissible basis evidence to 
the jury, the court was required to instruct the jury that the evidence could 
only be used to evaluate the expert’s opinion, and not for the truth.198  The 
district court had admitted an expert appraiser’s report with several 
inadmissible attachments.199  The Ninth Circuit held that the attachments 
would not have been admissible even with a limiting instruction, but 
explained that a limiting instruction is necessary “[w]hen inadmissible 
evidence . . . is admitted to illustrate and explain the expert’s opinion.”200  
On the other hand, in United States v. Rollins,201 the Seventh Circuit did not 
object to an expert’s disclosure of hearsay to the jury.202  In Rollins, an FBI 
agent testified as an expert to provide his opinion on the meaning of code 
words used in taped telephone conversations between one of the defendants 
and a government informant.203  The agent testified that the informant told 
him that the code word “t-shirts” referred to cocaine.204  The Seventh 
Circuit upheld the admission of the expert’s testimony.205  The court did 
not address the issue of limiting instructions, and did not explicitly adopt 
Professor Rice’s approach of using Rule 703 as a hearsay exception.206
 
 194. Id. at 63–64. 
  
 195. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 229 (3d ed. 1998) (“It does not appear that any reported case has 
expressly recognized Rule 703 as creating an exception to the hearsay rule . . . .”); Epps, 
supra note 48, at 64 (“Not surprisingly, no located case makes this ruling explicitly.”); Rice, 
supra note 165, at 500 (“Professor Imwinkelried, again quoting Professor Epps, noted that 
not a single case has adopted the Rice view.  Sadly, I must acknowledge that this is true.”). 
 196. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment. 
 197. 109 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 198. Id. at 1496; see FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment 
(describing 0.59 Acres of Land as holding that it was an “error to admit hearsay offered as 
the basis of an expert opinion, without a limiting instruction”). 
 199. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d at 1495–96. 
 200. Id. at 1496; see also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 195, at 229 n.96 
(describing 0.59 Acres of Land as “holding [that] it was error to admit hearsay as the basis 
for an expert’s opinion without a limiting instruction”). 
 201. 862 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 202. Id. at 1292–93; see also FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 
amendment (describing Rollins as “admitting, as part of the basis of an FBI agent’s expert 
opinion on the meaning of code language, the hearsay statements of an informant”). 
 203. Rollins, 862 F.2d at 1285, 1291–93. 
 204. Id. at 1293. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
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Nevertheless, the court did seemingly admit the hearsay for substantive use 
by the jury.207
Thus, while no court held that Rule 703 created a hearsay exception (or 
an exception to the other rules of evidence), courts, at least on occasion, 
allowed experts to disclose otherwise inadmissible basis evidence without a 
limiting instruction.
 
208  A court that did allow an expert to disclose 
inadmissible basis evidence without requiring a limiting instruction 
effectively admitted the evidence for its substance.209  In addition, even if 
courts did not treat Rule 703 as a hearsay exception, considerable debate 
surrounded the proper application of Rule 703 and the effectiveness of 
limiting instructions under the Rule.210
C.  The 2000 Amendment to Rule 703 
  In 2000, the Rule was amended to 
address these concerns. 
In 2000, Rule 703 was amended to clarify that it did not function as a 
hearsay exception, and to create a presumption against disclosing 
inadmissible basis evidence.  The amendment added a third sentence to the 
Rule, which now provides: 
 The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for 
the opinion or inference to be admitted.  Facts or data that are otherwise 
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the 
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value 
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect.211
Taken as a whole, Rule 703 permits an expert to disclose inadmissible 
basis evidence to the jury if two requirements are satisfied.  First, the expert 
must have permissibly relied on the inadmissible information.  That is, the 
inadmissible information must be “of a type reasonably relied upon by 





 207. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 
  Second, the court must—if the opponent of the expert objects 
to the disclosure—determine that the probative value of the information in 
195, at 229 n.96 (describing 
Rollins as “admitting, apparently for substantive use, the statements of an informant as part 
of the basis for the expert opinion testimony of an F.B.I. agent on the meaning of code 
language”). 
 208. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting (Apr. 14–15, 
1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ev4-
97.htm (“[T]he Reporter was instructed . . . to report on whether [Rule 703] was being used 
as a ‘back-door’ hearsay exception.  The Reporter’s responsive memorandum concluded that 
there were some cases in which hearsay had been offered as the basis of an expert’s opinion, 
but without a limiting instruction.”). 
 209. See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 211. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 212. Id. 
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assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect.213
Courts take two approaches to the first requirement.
 
214  Under one 
approach, the trial judge undertakes an independent investigation to 
determine reasonable reliance as a preliminary matter under Rule 104(a).215  
Under the other approach, the trial judge pays more deference to the expert 
role, and merely confirms that the expert has relied on information upon 
which other experts in the field rely.216  The requirement of reasonable 
reliance must be passed for the expert to rely on the inadmissible evidence 
at all, even if the expert does not disclose it.  If the court determines that the 
expert has relied on information that a reasonable expert would not, the 
opinion may be excluded.217
The second requirement, which reverses Rule 403’s presumption of 
admissibility, creates a presumption against disclosing the information to 
the jury.
 
218  The prejudicial effect that the court must consider should 
include the likelihood that the jury will be able to follow a limiting 
instruction.219
Notably, Rule 703 does not prevent the opponent of an expert from fully 
exploring the basis of the expert’s testimony on cross-examination.
 
220  
Indeed, Rule 705 provides that “[t]he expert may . . . be required to disclose 
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.”221
 
 213. FED. R. EVID. 703; id. advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment (“The 
information may be disclosed to the jury, upon objection, only if the trial court finds that the 
probative value of the information in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”). 
  If the expert’s basis 
evidence has flaws, it may be unfair to the proponent to prevent the expert 
from disclosing and explaining the basis evidence during the expert’s direct 
testimony, leaving the opponent to catch the expert in a “gotcha” moment 
 214. 1 PAUL G. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. IMWINKELRIED, JR., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
§ 5.05[c], at 312–13 (4th ed. 2007). 
 215. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We now make 
clear that it is the judge who makes the determination of reasonable reliance . . . .”); see also 
KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6.1.b (“The dominant view is that courts have an 
independent obligation to assess the reasonableness of an expert’s reliance on a type of 
factual data.”).  Rule 104(a) provides that the court determines “[p]reliminary questions 
concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 216. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6.1.b (describing a “minority view” in which 
courts only examine whether experts typically rely on similar information); Blinka, supra 
note 134, at 51–52 (arguing that courts are reluctant to “second-guess” experts on the issue 
of reasonable reliance); Epps, supra note 48, at 76 (describing a “liberal approach,” 
according to which courts may not independently evaluate reasonable reliance). 
 217. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 697 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If the data underlying the 
expert’s opinion are so unreliable that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, 
the opinion resting on that data must be excluded.” (citing In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 748)). 
 218. Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 (permitting disclosure of information if the probative 
value in evaluating the expert’s opinion “substantially outweighs” the information’s 
prejudicial effect), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting exclusion of information if the 
probative value “is substantially outweighed by” the prejudicial effect). 
 219. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment. 
 220. Id. 
 221. FED. R. EVID. 705; see FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 
amendment. 
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during cross-examination.222  Indeed, calling into question the bases of an 
expert’s testimony can be an important way for an opponent to challenge 
the expert’s opinion.223 
If the opponent does challenge the expert’s basis, the door may be open 
for the proponent to respond with basis evidence that could not have been 
disclosed earlier.224  In addition, the proponent might want to preemptively 
expose the flaws in the basis evidence to “‘remove the sting’ from the 
opponent’s anticipated attack.”225  The advisory committee’s note therefore 
directs the trial court to consider the proponent’s possible strategic 
considerations when conducting the required balancing under Rule 703.226  
In view of this direction, a weakness in inadmissible basis evidence may 
actually counsel in favor of disclosure.227 
The amendment to Rule 703 was intended “to emphasize that when an 
expert reasonably relies on inadmissible information to form an opinion or 
inference, the underlying information is not admissible simply because the 
opinion or inference is admitted.”228  To do so, it created a presumption 
against disclosure that reversed the Rule 403 presumption of 
admissibility.229  The presumption against disclosure, together with the 
probability that limiting instructions could be impossible for a jury to 
follow, at least in the context of Rule 703,230 would suggest that disclosure 
should be rare.  On the other hand, the need for the jury to hear the 
underlying evidence to understand the expert’s opinion,231 coupled with the 
likelihood that an opponent may explore the evidence anyway,232 counsel 
admission.  The next part of this Note examines the application of amended 
Rule 703 in the courts. 
II.  THE APPLICATION OF RULE 703 IN THE COURTS 
The amendment to Rule 703 addressed the controversy around 
inadmissible basis evidence by clarifying that Rule 703 did not serve as a 
hearsay exception and by creating a new presumption against disclosure of 
 
 222. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 223. See John F. Stoviak & Christina D. Riggs, Preparing for and Cross-Examining the 
Opposing Expert at Trial, in LITIGATORS ON EXPERTS:  STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING EXPERT 
WITNESSES FROM RETENTION THROUGH TRIAL 326, 332–33 (Wendy Gerwick Couture & 
Allyson W. Haynes eds., 2010) (describing attacking an expert’s bases as inaccurate or 
unsupported, and attacking an expert’s bases as incomplete as two of five suggested ways to 
undermine expert testimony). 
 224. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment (“[A]n 
adversary’s attack on an expert’s basis will often open the door to a proponent’s rebuttal 
with information that was reasonably relied upon by the expert, even if that information 
would not have been discloseable initially under the balancing test provided by this 
amendment.”). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Cf. id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text. 
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the inadmissible evidence.233  Nevertheless, as explained in Part II.A, to the 
extent that the problem of back door evidence stems from a party inducing 
an expert to rely on questionable evidence in the hopes of disclosing such 
evidence to the jury, an examination of reasonable reliance acts as a first 
barrier to disclosure.234  If the court determines that the expert has, in fact, 
reasonably relied on inadmissible basis evidence, then the balancing test in 
the added third sentence of Rule 703 acts as a second barrier to 
disclosure.235
Accordingly, the effectiveness of a limiting instruction becomes 
important.  If a limiting instruction is ineffective, then the evidence 
disclosed in these cases turns into substantive evidence.
  Part II.B reviews federal court opinions considering 
disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence during two-year periods before 
and after the 2000 amendment.  This review shows a tendency toward 
disclosure before the amendment, which was curbed by the amendment to 
Rule 703.  Even after the amendment, however, disclosure still occurs in a 
substantial number of cases. 
236
A.  Back Door Evidence and Reasonable Reliance 
  Part II.C 
considers a subset of inadmissible basis evidence—evidence that would 
violate a criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights if used for 
substantive purposes—that demonstrates that in at least one instance, Rule 
703’s approach of limited admissibility is not tenable. 
To the extent that the problem of back door evidence stems from a party 
inducing an expert to rely on questionable evidence in the hopes of 
disclosing such evidence to the jury,237 an examination of reasonable 
reliance acts as a first barrier to disclosure.238  Courts in this context appear 
particularly suspicious of experts who rely on data selected for them by the 
parties who hire them, instead of conducting some independent 
investigation.239
 
 233. See supra Part I.C. 
 
 234. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 213, 218 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. 
 237. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. C 04-02123, C 04-03327, C 04-
03732, C 05-03117, 2008 WL 2323856, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2008) (second omnibus 
order) (condemning the “abuse[]” of “spoon-feeding . . . client-prepared and lawyer-
orchestrated” information to experts in the hopes of putting such information before the 
jury); Blinka, supra note 101, at 1249–54 (describing the use of Rule 703 to circumvent 
other rules and place information before the jury). 
 238. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Therasense, 2008 WL 2323856, at *1; Sinco, Inc. v. U.S. Chicory Inc., No. 
8:03CV315, 2005 WL 2180094, at *2–3 (D. Neb. Aug. 10, 2005) (order on motion in 
limine) (suggesting that an expert’s testimony on some topics may be inadmissible under 
Rules 403 and 703 because the opinions were “based, in large part, on ‘biased information’ 
provided . . . by the owner of [the] Defendant [corporation]”); Crowley v. Chait, 322 
F. Supp. 2d 530, 542–43 (D.N.J. 2004) (order on motions in limine) (barring an expert’s 
opinion to the extent that it was based on “preselected deposition testimony” rather than 
independent investigation). 
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In addition, Rule 703 does not allow experts to serve as conduits for 
information upon which they have not actually relied.240  For example, in 
United States v. Mejia,241 the Second Circuit explained that a gang expert 
could rely on hearsay, but could not merely repeat it.242  In Mejia, the 
expert’s testimony contained both acceptable expert opinion obtained from 
a “synthesis of various source materials” and unacceptable testimony in 
which the expert did not analyze the source material, but “merely repeated 
their contents.”243  As discussed in Part III.B, this distinction between 
analysis and repetition does not resolve whether an expert has improperly 
transmitted hearsay in violation of Rule 703:  an expert can both analyze 
inadmissible evidence and repeat its contents to the jury.244  In Loeffel Steel 
Products, Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc.,245 the court determined that the 
defendant’s damages expert had impermissibly calculated the plaintiff’s 
loss using information provided by the defendant that the expert was 
incapable of evaluating.246  Along similar lines, in Sterling v. Provident Life 
& Accident Insurance Co.,247 the plaintiff attempted to introduce hearsay 
through its expert, but the expert admitted that she had no expertise about 
the claims to which the hearsay related.248
Finally, if the court determines that the expert has, in fact, reasonably 
relied on inadmissible basis evidence, then the balancing test of Rule 703 
acts as a second barrier to disclosure.
 
249  This balancing test, added in 2000, 
creates a presumption against disclosure of inadmissible evidence even for 
evidence upon which an expert has reasonably relied.250  The test could 
serve as an important barrier against inadmissible evidence, but competing 
and substantial interests weigh on both sides of the balance.251
B.  Pre- and Post-amendment Application of Rule 703 
  The next 
section addresses the effect of this balancing in practice. 
This section reviews the application of Rule 703 before and after the 
2000 amendment to assess the balancing test added to Rule 703 in 2000.  
The review of the pre-amendment Rule examines the years 1997 and 1998 
because any problem corrected by the amendment should have been 
apparent in these years.  The review of amended Rule 703 examines the 
years 2007 and 2008 because by that time courts should have become 
 
 240. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6273 
(1997 & Supp. 2011) (explaining that Rule 703 is “simply inapplicable” and does not permit 
disclosing inadmissible basis evidence “when . . . the expert adds nothing to the out-of-court 
statements other than transmitting them to the jury”). 
 241. 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 242. Id. at 197. 
 243. Id. at 197–98. 
 244. See infra Part III.B. 
 245. 387 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (order on motion in limine). 
 246. Id. at 807–10. 
 247. 619 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (order granting partial summary judgment). 
 248. Id. at 1258–59. 
 249. See supra notes 213, 218 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 220–32 and accompanying text. 
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familiar with the 2000 amendment.  The review does not consider decisions 
that turned on the first threshold issue described above in Parts I.C and II.A 
(whether the expert reasonably relied on the inadmissible basis 
evidence).252
The review suggests that the presumption against disclosure added to 
Rule 703 had at least some effect.  Before the amendment, a tendency 
toward disclosure is apparent, as discussed in Part II.B.1.  After the 
amendment, the cases are more evenly divided, as discussed in Part II.B.2, 
but disclosure still occurs in a substantial number of cases. 
  Instead, the review focuses on the 2000 amendment to Rule 
703 by considering decisions that address disclosure of the inadmissible 
basis evidence where reasonable reliance was established or not at issue.  A 
measure of subjectivity was involved, of course, in classifying courts’ 
reasoning, which was not necessarily explicit. 
1.  Pre-amendment Application of Rule 703 
In 1997 and 1998, nine surveyed federal court opinions considered 
disclosure of inadmissible expert basis evidence under Rule 703.  Of these 
nine, six permitted disclosure,253 while three prohibited it.254
No clear pattern emerges from the cases.  Some allowed disclosure of 
seemingly minor evidence, but others permitted disclosure of apparently 
  Although the 
issue was not heavily litigated, this two-to-one ratio suggests a tendency 
toward permitting disclosure of the underlying basis evidence. 
 
 252. See supra Part II.A; notes 212, 214–17 and accompanying text. 
 253. Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 274–75 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(upholding disclosure that the opponent of the expert did not object to, on plain error 
review); Garner ex rel. Walden v. Howe, 105 F.3d 647, No. 95-2492, 1997 WL 9764, at *3–
5 (4th Cir. Jan. 13 1997) (unpublished table decision) (upholding a trial court’s decision to 
allow an expert to discuss an article upon which he had relied); In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust 
Litig., Nos. 96-2338, 96-1131, 96-2003, 96-2111, 95-2104, 1998 WL 1031508, at *1 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 20, 1998) (memorandum explaining evidentiary ruling) (explaining that disclosure 
of fewer than ten objected-to documents that were not the focus of the expert’s opinion did 
not present a problem under Rule 703); Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, No. CIV97-
4014, 1998 WL 2017925, at *1, 3–4 (D.S.D. Sept. 17, 1998) (order denying defendant’s 
motion for new trial) (approving the testimony of a “vocational rehabilitation specialist” who 
testified that records he reviewed indicated that the plaintiff had a “partial impairment of 
eleven percent”); Kinser v. Gehl Co., No. Civ.A. 96-2361, 1998 WL 231065, at *4 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 21, 1998) (order denying defendant’s motions for judgment as a matter of law or new 
trial) (permitting disclosure of the contents of documents relied on by experts); United States 
v. Morris, No. Crim. A. 94-00046-C, 1997 WL 17649, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 13, 1997) 
(reasoning that Rule 703 permits experts to introduce inadmissible information, which in this 
case included hearsay statements by gang members). 
 254. United States v. Quintanilla, 165 F.3d 920, Nos. 97-10339, 97-10540, 98-10091, 
1998 WL 895360, at *5–6 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (finding no reversible 
error in a district court decision preventing defendant’s expert on battered women’s 
syndrome from discussing the bases of his opinion, because the jury could not have relied on 
the evidence for its substance to establish the events relied on in any event); Arkwright Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir. 1997) (approving a district 
court’s decision to admit an opinion that relied on another expert’s report and to exclude the 
substance of the other expert’s report); United States v. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d 1493, 
1496–97 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the challenged basis evidence was “not of the kind that 
might be admitted in connection with the expert’s testimony, regardless of the presence of a 
limiting instruction”). 
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significant evidence.  A trial judge in one case explained that the disclosure 
of a small number of documents did not present a problem, when the 
documents did not play a central role in the expert’s opinion and the court 
gave the jury a limiting instruction to explain that the documents could not 
be considered for the truth of what they contained.255
On the other hand, in Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, a 
“vocational rehabilitation specialist” testified for the plaintiff.
 
256  Over the 
defendant’s objection, the court allowed the specialist to testify that he had 
reviewed the plaintiff’s medical history, and that two doctors had 
determined that the plaintiff suffered from “a permanent partial impairment 
of eleven percent of the whole body.”257  The Eighth Circuit later upheld 
the trial court’s approach.258  The court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the plaintiff had been improperly allowed to present the testimony of 
medical experts through the testimony of its vocational specialist.259  In 
Brennan, the plaintiff appears to have succeeded in a tactic that Professor 
Carlson warned against—presenting the testimony of an expert who 
discloses the opinions of multiple other experts, effectively presenting the 
testimony of several experts to the jury, while having to produce (and 
subject to cross-examination) only one of them.260
2.  Application of Amended Rule 703 
 
In 2007 and 2008, fourteen surveyed federal court opinions considered 
disclosure of inadmissible expert basis evidence under Rule 703.  Of these 
fourteen, seven permitted disclosure,261 while seven prohibited it.262
 
 255. In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust Litig., 1998 WL 1031508, at *1. 
  
 256. Brennan, 1998 WL 2017925, at *1. 
 257. Id. at *3 (quoting the testimony of the specialist). 
 258. Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, 211 F.3d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 259. Id. at 450, 452. 
 260. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.  In contrast to Brennan, a different case 
in the surveyed period recognized the problem of allowing one expert to introduce another 
expert’s opinion. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (approving a district court’s decision to admit an opinion that relied in part on 
another expert’s report, and to exclude the substance of the other expert’s report). 
 261. United States v. Wolling, 223 F. App’x 610, 612–13 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding a 
district court’s decision to permit defense experts to describe the contents of medical records 
that were excluded under Rule 403, and to refuse the jury’s request to view the records 
themselves); United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Aon Ltd., Civ. No. 04-539, 2008 WL 3819865, at *14–
15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2008) (orders on motions in limine) (permitting an expert to disclose 
the contents of hearsay English court decisions, but “anticipat[ing]” that the jury would be 
prevented from receiving the decisions in the jury room); Betts v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 
3:04cv169-M-A, 2008 WL 2789524, at *10 (N.D. Miss. July 16, 2008) (order on motions in 
limine and for summary judgment) (citing Rule 703 as permitting an expert to testify about 
documents not admissible in evidence); Galloway v. Big G Express, Inc, No. 3:05-CV-545, 
2008 WL 2704443, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. July 3, 2008) (order on motions in limine) (permitting 
an expert to discuss inadmissible basis evidence for limited purposes, and indicating that a 
limiting instruction would be issued); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, Civil Nos. 06-25, 05-2596, 2007 WL 1964337, at *3–4, 6 
(D. Minn. June 29, 2007) (order on motions in limine) (permitting experts to testify based on 
certain underlying data, and raising the possibility of issuing a limiting instruction “to meet 
the Rule 703 balancing test”); Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 470 
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Again, no clear pattern emerges from the cases.263  Given the fact-
dependent nature of the balancing test under Rule 703264 and the varying 
facts of the cases, however, a clear pattern would be unexpected.  
Considering the cases from 2007 and 2008 in the aggregate, the breakdown 
of seven decisions permitting disclosure and seven prohibiting disclosure 
suggests that the amendment to Rule 703 at least reduced a tendency toward 
disclosure that existed before 2000.265  Still, while amended Rule 703 may 
have curbed a pre-2000 tendency toward disclosure, half of the reviewed 
decisions permitted disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence.266  As a 
result, the debate over the proper treatment of inadmissible basis evidence 
retains significance.267
One of the reviewed cases from 2007, United States v. Wolling,
 
268 
illustrates a jury confronting the proper way to evaluate basis evidence 
underlying expert opinion testimony.  The defendant in Wolling presented 
the expert testimony of a doctor in support of his diminished capacity 
defense.269  The expert testified that he relied on medical records relating to 
a psychologist’s prior evaluation of the defendant.270  The court excluded 
the medical records under Rule 403.271
 
F. Supp. 2d 435, 443 (D. Del. 2007) (order on motion in limine) (reasoning that the 
probative value of the expert basis evidence substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect 
under the balancing test of Rule 703); In re Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 596–97 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
2007) (finding an otherwise inadmissible report admissible to explain the expert’s opinion, 
but not for substantive use). 
  Nevertheless, the expert, apparently 
 262. Wiles v. Dep’t of Educ., Civ. Nos. 04-00442, 05-00247, 2008 WL 6808428, at *2 
(D. Haw. Oct. 7, 2008) (order on motion in limine) (holding that for statements underlying 
an expert opinion to be admitted, the proponent would be required to demonstrate that the 
statements were not hearsay or fell under a hearsay exception); Rideout v. Nguyen, No. 
4:05CV-00001, 2008 WL 3850390, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2008) (order on motions in 
limine) (permitting expert reliance on, but not disclosure of, apparently inadmissible 
evidence); Peters v. Nissan Forklift Corp. N. Am., No. 06-2880, 2008 WL 2625522, at *2–3 
(E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2008) (order on motion in limine) (prohibiting disclosure of inadmissible 
documents of similar accidents in a product liability action); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. 
Rambus Inc., Nos. CV-00-20905, C-05-00334, C-06-00244, 2008 WL 282376, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2008) (order on motions in limine) (ruling that a prior Federal Circuit decision 
from a different litigation could not be disclosed under Rule 703); McDevitt v. Guenther, 
522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1294 (D. Haw. 2007) (orders on motions for summary judgment and 
motion in limine) (prohibiting an expert from reciting otherwise inadmissible facts under 
Rule 703); Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 512 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D. La. 2007) (order on 
objections to exhibits, motions in limine, and motions to quash) (permitting an expert to rely 
on an inadmissible report, and appearing to permit only general reference to the report 
itself); Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:04-CV-6059, 2007 WL 715526, at *1–
2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (order on motions in limine) (preventing disclosure of hearsay 
statements of the plaintiff from the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, after weighing the 
probative value and prejudicial effect of disclosure). 
 263. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 264. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 703; id. advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment. 
 265. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 266. See supra notes 261–62. 
 267. See supra Part I.B. 
 268. 223 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 269. Id. at 612. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
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without objection from the prosecution, informed the jury of the medical 
diagnoses in the medical records.272  During deliberations, the jury asked to 
review the medical records upon which the expert had relied.273  The judge 
refused, and explained that the expert had described the medical records 
only to support his opinions.274
The jury in Wolling, in evaluating the expert’s opinion, sought to more 
closely evaluate the basis evidence underlying the opinion.
 
275  Indeed, it 
may be impossible to accept or reject an expert’s opinion without accepting 
or rejecting the underlying data.276  In Wolling, the judge’s limiting 
instruction and refusal to provide the records to the jury counteracted the 
jury’s desire to scrutinize information that the judge had already found to be 
substantially more prejudicial than probative.277
Even if the amendment to Rule 703 has reduced the frequency of 
disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence, disclosure continues to occur.
 
278  
Indeed, in some cases it may not be possible for the jury to meaningfully 
evaluate an expert’s opinion without hearing the underlying evidence.279
The resulting disclosure, however necessary, can place prejudicial 
information before the jury.  In United States v. Leeson,
 
280 the defendant 
challenged the disclosure of basis evidence by a psychologist who testified 
as an expert for the government.281  The district court allowed the 
psychologist to testify that he relied on statements from two of the 
defendant’s fellow inmates, who had not spoken to the testifying expert, but 
rather to a different psychologist.282  According to the testifying expert, the 
two inmates reported that the defendant had requested help in “looking 
crazy.”283  The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had correctly 
allowed disclosure of the inmates’ statements, in view of the high relevance 
of the statements for the purpose of evaluating the psychologist’s 
opinion.284
Even after the amendment to Rule 703, then, disclosure of inadmissible 
basis evidence can be expected in a significant number of cases because of 
the jury’s need to hear the evidence to evaluate the expert’s opinion.  If a 
limiting instruction is ineffective, then the evidence disclosed in these cases 
 
 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 613. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 270–73. 
 276. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra text accompanying note 274. 
 278. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 279. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99-MDL-1317, 2005 WL 
5955699, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2005) (order on motions in limine) (reasoning that the jury 
would be unable to evaluate expert opinions without disclosure of the basis evidence); 
Hambrick v. Ken-Bar Mfg. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 627, 639 (W.D. Va. 2002) (order denying 
motion for summary judgment) (explaining that a “survey’s probative value is essential for 
understanding and evaluating” the expert opinion). 
 280. 453 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 281. Id. at 636–38. 
 282. Id. at 634–35. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 637–38. 
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turns into substantive evidence,285
C.  Expert Reliance on Testimonial Hearsay 
 despite Rule 703’s intent that such 
evidence be used only for the limited purpose of evaluating the expert’s 
testimony.  The next section discusses the disclosure of inadmissible basis 
evidence that would violate the Confrontation Clause if used substantively.  
This subset of inadmissible basis evidence demonstrates that in at least one 
area, Rule 703’s approach of limited admissibility is not tenable. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”286  In its 2004 decision in Crawford v. 
Washington,287 the Supreme Court altered its approach to hearsay under the 
Confrontation Clause.  Under the Court’s 1980 decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts,288 the Confrontation Clause permitted the prosecution to use an 
unavailable witness’s statement against the defendant if the statement 
possessed sufficient “indicia of reliability.”289  The test was satisfied if the 
statement fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or when it 
possessed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”290  In Crawford, 
the Court rejected this reliability-based approach.291  In its place, the Court 
adopted a test focusing on whether the hearsay was “testimonial.”292  If a 
statement is testimonial, the Confrontation Clause permits its introduction 
against the defendant only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant 
has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.293  According to the 
Court in Crawford, confrontation is the only constitutionally acceptable 
method of assuring the reliability of such statements.294
The Court did not provide detailed guidance to explain what hearsay can 
be considered testimonial.
 
295  The Court’s guidelines did indicate that 
testimonial generally includes statements that resemble testimony at trial, 
such as statements made before a grand jury, as well as statements made 
under circumstances that suggest they would be used in prosecution, such 
as statements made in a police interrogation.296
 
 285. See supra notes 
 
139–41 and accompanying text. 
 286. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 287. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 288. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 289. Id. at 66; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
 290. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
 291. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–68. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 68. 
 294. Id. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes:  confrontation.”). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 51–52, 68; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation 
Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 792 (2007).  The Court later 
clarified that statements made to police for the “primary purpose” of resolving an ongoing 
emergency are not testimonial. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  On the 
other hand, statements made for the “primary purpose” of proving past events, rather than 
resolving an emergency, are testimonial. Id.  As explained by the Court in Michigan v. 
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After Crawford, the Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts297 
that “certificates of analysis,” which indicated that a forensic analysis 
showed a substance to be cocaine, were testimonial.298  And most recently, 
in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,299 the Court held that the defendant in a 
drunk-driving prosecution had a right to be confronted with the actual 
scientific analyst who tested the defendant’s blood to produce a blood 
alcohol report (which was testimonial evidence).300  A different analyst 
who “had neither participated in nor observed the test” could not 
constitutionally serve as a substitute.301
1.  The Intersection of Crawford and Disclosure of Basis Evidence 
 
Much information that an expert might rely on is nontestimonial.302  But 
experts can also rely on testimonial statements that would be hearsay if 
offered for their truth.303  For example, a gang expert might rely on 
information obtained from police interrogations performed while 
investigating the defendant, or a psychologist might interview the family of 
a defendant in preparing to oppose a defendant’s insanity defense.304
Perhaps significantly, the Court in Bullcoming noted that the substitute 
analyst did not offer an “independent opinion” on the blood alcohol 
report.
  In 
addition, one forensic expert might offer an opinion based on a testimonial 
report prepared by a different expert. 
305  Justice Sotomayor, one of five votes for the holding, discussed 
this point somewhat further, in “emphasiz[ing] the limited reach” of the 
opinion.306  Justice Sotomayor pointed out that Bullcoming did not involve 
an expert witness “asked for his independent opinion about underlying 
testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence.”307
 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155, 1157 & n.9 (2011), a statement can be nontestimonial in the 
absence of an ongoing emergency.  In making this point, the Court may have walked back 
from Crawford toward the reliability standard of Roberts. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155, 1157 & 
n.9 (“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to 
identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”); see also Colin Miller, Michigan v. 
Bryant, Part 6, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Mar. 3, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
evidenceprof/2011/03/yesterday-i-posted-an-entryaboutjustice-scalia-accusing-the-majority-
in-michigan-v-bryantofretreating-fromcrawford-v-washi.html (“Thus, it seems to me that the 
majority in Michigan v. Bryant is using the Ohio v. Roberts ‘adequate indicia or reliability’ 
test to determine whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial.”). 
  In 
 297. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 298. Id. at 2530–32. 
 299. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 300. Id. at 2709–11, 2715–17. 
 301. Id. at 2709, 2715–16. 
 302. See id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (describing statements made for 
medical treatment as nontestimonial); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011); 
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539–40 (“Business and public records are generally 
admissible absent confrontation . . . because . . . they are not testimonial.”). 
 303. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 801–09. 
 304. See id. at 808; see also United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Melendez-Diaz did not do away with Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”). 
 305. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715–16 (majority opinion). 
 306. Id. at 2719, 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). 
 307. Id. at 2722. 
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doing so, she pointed out that Rule 703 allows experts to base opinions on 
inadmissible evidence.308  According to Justice Sotomayor, the court 
“would face a different question if asked to determine the constitutionality 
of allowing an expert witness to discuss others’ testimonial statements if the 
testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.”309
In a footnote in Crawford, the Court parenthetically remarked that the 
Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”
  This 
reasoning parallels that used by lower federal courts in considering expert 
witness testimony based on possibly testimonial statements, as discussed in 
Part II.C.2. 
310  Taken 
at face value, this statement would permit an expert to rely on and disclose 
testimonial hearsay for the purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion, 
because that purpose is “other than [for] establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted.”311  That is, if the expert discloses a testimonial statement only for 
the purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion, then the statement has not 
been offered for the truth of the matter asserted.  Therefore, the statement is 
not testimonial hearsay,312 and the Confrontation Clause does not apply.313  
This rationale is widespread in the courts.314
2.  People v. Goldstein 
  The New York Court of 
Appeals, however, has rejected this reasoning, as explained in the next 
section. 
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the non-hearsay explanation for 
expert basis evidence in People v. Goldstein.315  Goldstein reversed the 
conviction of a mentally ill man for killing a stranger by throwing her in 
front of a subway train.316
 
 308. Id. 
  Expert psychiatrists testified for the prosecution 
 309. Id. 
 310. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 
U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). But see James L. Kainen & Carrie A. Tendler, The Case for a 
Constitutional Definition of Hearsay:  Requiring Confrontation of Testimonial, Nonassertive 
Conduct and Statements Admitted to Explain an Unchallenged Investigation, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1415, 1449–72 (2010) (arguing that admitting a testimonial statement for the nominally 
not-for-the-truth purpose of explaining an investigator’s action, when the defendant has not 
challenged the action, should be understood as a Confrontation Clause violation); Stephen 
Aslett, Comment, Crawford’s Curious Dictum:  Why Testimonial “Nonhearsay” Implicates 
the Confrontation Clause, 82 TUL. L. REV. 297, 338 (2007) (arguing that the statement in 
footnote nine of Crawford conflicts with the framers’ understanding of hearsay). 
 311. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Street, 471 U.S. at 414); see supra notes 90–94 
and accompanying text. 
 312. To be hearsay, the statement must be offered “to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 811–29 (explaining and criticizing this argument); 
see also supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 314. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.10.1; Seaman, supra note 31, at 846 n.93 
(collecting cases). 
 315. 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–34 (N.Y. 2005). 
 316. Id. at 728–29. 
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and defense.317  The prosecution’s expert argued that the defendant’s illness 
was “relatively mild,” and that he used his illness as an excuse for violent, 
predatory acts against women.318  The trial court permitted the 
prosecution’s expert to repeat what six people told her about the 
defendant.319  The Court of Appeals, focusing on four of the six declarants, 
determined that their out of court statements were testimonial under 
Crawford.320  The prosecution made the argument described above, that the 
statements had only been offered to evaluate the expert’s opinion, not for 
their truth.321
The court rejected the argument, reasoning that the jury could not have 
used the statements to evaluate the expert’s opinion without accepting the 
statements as true or false.
 
322  The prosecution, the court pointed out, 
wanted the jury to accept the statements as true and to accept the opinion 
based on them.323  The statements had been offered for their truth, and were 
therefore testimonial hearsay under Crawford.324
As Professor Jennifer Mnookin explains, the Goldstein court recognized 
that the purpose for which the prosecution offered the statements required 
the jury to assess the reliability of the speakers.
 
325  The statements were 
actually offered for a hearsay purpose.326  Thus, while it might have been 
acceptable for the expert to refer to her sources in general terms, it violated 
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights to allow the expert to repeat the 
hearsay statements of her sources.327
Even if only a general reference is allowed, however, expert reliance on 
testimonial hearsay raises an additional question:  what if the defendant 
attacks the basis of the expert’s opinion?  Under the approach to Rules 703 
and 705 suggested by the advisory committee’s notes, if the opponent 
challenges the expert’s basis, the door may be open for the proponent to 




 317. Id. at 729. 
  
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 733–34. 
 321. Id. at 732; see supra Part II.C.1. 
 322. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 732. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 733; see Mnookin, supra note 296, at 824–26 (characterizing the Goldstein 
analysis as “spot on:  courts should not be able to avoid analysis of the Crawford issues 
present when prosecution experts disclose the substance of their sources on direct 
examination, through the fictional claim that such statements are offered for a purpose other 
than their truth”). 
 325. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 826. 
 326. Id.; cf. Kainen & Tendler, supra note 310, at 1449–72 (explaining that when a court 
admits a testimonial statement to explain the action of an investigator even though the 
defendant has not challenged the action, the statement lacks any permissible nonhearsay use 
(such as rebutting a defendant’s challenge to an investigator’s action)). 
 327. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 826–27 (suggesting that referring to the general 
nature of an expert’s sources, instead of the detailed substance of the information they 
provided, is more supportable under Crawford). 
 328. See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text. 
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Whether this approach should apply to testimonial hearsay remains 
unsettled.329
3.  Testimonial Hearsay and Expert Testimony in Federal Courts 
 
Federal courts have not yet adopted Goldstein’s reasoning, though 
concern exists about transmitting testimonial hearsay through experts.  
Thus, for example, the Second Circuit reasoned in United States v. 
Lombardozzi,330 that an expert could rely on testimonial statements, but 
could not communicate them or directly convey their substance to the 
jury.331  In another Second Circuit case, United States v. Mejia,332 the court 
held that the government’s expert had reasonably relied on various hearsay 
statements, but warned against allowing the expert to transmit hearsay to 
the jury.333  In Mejia, the expert repeated information without analysis in a 
way that suggested to the court that he was summarizing the evidence, and 
not acting as an expert.334
As phrased by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Johnson,
 
335 expert 
reliance on testimonial hearsay is problematic “only” if the expert “is used 
as little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial hearsay, rather 
than as a true expert whose considered opinion sheds light on some 
specialized factual situation.”336  The experts in Johnson did not refer to the 
contents of any testimonial statements, however, and the admission of their 
testimony was therefore upheld.337  The Fourth Circuit made similar 
arguments in upholding the admission of expert testimony in United States 
v. Ayala.338  Quoting Johnson, the Ayala court explained that “the question 
when applying Crawford to expert testimony is ‘whether the expert is, in 
essence, giving an independent judgment or merely acting as a transmitter 
for testimonial hearsay.’”339
These cases recognize that the government violates the defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights when it uses an expert as a conduit for 




 329. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.10.4. 
 these cases do not relate to a 
situation in which the testimonial hearsay was communicated to the jury in 
addition to the expert’s opinion.  Instead, Johnson and Ayala in particular 
 330. 491 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 331. Id. at 72–73.  In Lombardozzi, the court suggested that a small portion of the expert’s 
testimony might have been excludable on Confrontation Clause grounds because the only 
source for the expert’s information was testimonial evidence, but the error did not require 
reversal. Id. 
 332. 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 333. Id. at 197–98. 
 334. Id. at 197–99; see also United States v. Rubi-Gonzalez, 311 F. App’x 483, 487–88 
(2d Cir. 2009) (excluding the testimony of the same expert who testified in Mejia, for 
essentially the same reasons). 
 335. 587 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 336. Id. at 635. 
 337. Id. at 636. 
 338. 601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 339. Id. at 275 (quoting Johnson, 587 F.3d at 635). 
 340. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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suggest a dichotomy between transmitting hearsay and providing an expert 
opinion.341  As discussed above, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
Bullcoming also suggests that an “independent” expert opinion might avoid 
Confrontation Clause problems.342
However, the “independent opinion” distinction does not resolve the 
problem of expert reliance on testimonial hearsay.  As Goldstein and Rule 
703 demonstrate, an expert can both provide an opinion and transmit 
hearsay to the jury in support of the opinion.
 
343
III.  REVIEWING RULE 703 TEN YEARS LATER 
  Part III.B returns to this 
point. 
The 2000 amendment to Rule 703 emphasized that Rule 703 does not 
serve as an exception to the other rules of evidence.344  Instead, if an expert 
relies on evidence that is not admissible, the evidence can be disclosed to 
the jury only if the probative value of the evidence in evaluating the 
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect of disclosing 
the evidence.345
As discussed in Part II.B., a review of federal court opinions considering 
disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence during two-year periods before 
and after the 2000 amendment suggests that there was a tendency toward 
disclosure before the amendment, which was curbed somewhat by the 
amendment to Rule 703.
 
346  Even after the amendment, however, disclosure 
can still be expected in a substantial number of cases.347
Despite longstanding criticism and doubtful efficacy,
  As a result, the 
debate over the proper treatment of inadmissible basis evidence and the 
debate over the effectiveness of limiting instructions in this context retain 
significance. 
348 limiting 
instructions are used throughout the Rules of Evidence when the same 
evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another.349  
The limiting instruction contemplated by Rule 703 is problematic, however, 
particularly in the context of hearsay.  When otherwise inadmissible basis 
evidence is disclosed under Rule 703, the evidence is admitted for the 
limited purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion.350
 
 341. See supra notes 
  Thus, the jury must 
335–39 and accompanying text; see also Ross Andrew Oliver, Note, 
Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert Opinion:  The Intersection of the Confrontation 
Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 703 After Crawford v. Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 
1539, 1560 (2004) (suggesting a “continuum” with an expert who merely transmits others’ 
statements at one end, and an expert who provides a “truly original” opinion based on 
diverse sources at the other end). 
 342. See supra notes 306–09 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.2. 
 344. See supra Part I.C. 
 345. FED. R. EVID. 703; see supra Part I.C. 
 346. See supra Part II.B. 
 347. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 348. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also Mnookin, supra note 296, at 
812 (“Rules of limited admissibility are commonplace in evidence law.”) 
 350. See supra notes 128–30, 151–53, 157–59 and accompanying text. 
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somehow use the inadmissible basis evidence to evaluate the expert’s 
opinion, without considering whether or not the inadmissible basis evidence 
is true.351  Even outside the context of hearsay, allowing evidence that is 
inadmissible under other rules to be disclosed via Rule 703 risks frustrating 
the purpose of those rules.352
Expert reliance on testimonial hearsay is particularly troubling.
 
353
Part III.A revisits amended Rule 703 after ten years’ experience, outside 
of the context of the Confrontation Clause.  It ultimately advocates a 
modified version of the existing Rule’s approach that emphasizes the 
unworkability of limiting instructions in the context of Rule 703.  Part III.B 
addresses Rule 703 in the Confrontation Clause context. 
  Rule 
703’s approach, however, invites Confrontation Clause violations, by 
providing that an expert opinion can allow discussion of inadmissible 
evidence. 
A.  Acceptable Balancing 
The proper treatment of inadmissible basis evidence under Rule 703 
cannot be resolved merely by recognizing that juries cannot logically 
distinguish between substantive use and evaluative use of inadmissible 
basis evidence under Rule 703.  Indeed, Professors Rice and Carlson both 
agreed that limiting instructions are ineffective,354 and from there took 
opposite positions on the proper treatment of inadmissible basis 
evidence.355
1.  The Restrictive Approach 
  Even if it is assumed that the distinction between substantive 
use and evaluative use of inadmissible basis evidence is impossible for the 
jury, at least three potential approaches remain, based on the three 
approaches discussed in Part I.B.3.  Ultimately, the restrictive and open 
approaches are both unsatisfactory.  The current balancing approach, 
however, can still be expected to allow a substantial amount of disclosure.  
It should be applied with an understanding that a limiting instruction likely 
will be ineffective. 
The restrictive approach would allow an expert on direct examination to 
refer only to the sources of evidence upon which she relied, if the evidence 
was not otherwise admissible.356  This approach would solve the problem 
of unworkable limiting instructions.  However, the review of decisions on 
disclosure in 2007 and 2008 demonstrates that inadmissible basis evidence 
is disclosed in a substantial number of cases even though Rule 703 provides 
a presumption against disclosure,357
 
 351. See supra notes 
 which reflects a judicial determination 
128–30, 151–53, 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 353. See supra Part II.C. 
 354. See supra notes 151–53, 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra Part I.B.3.a–b. 
 356. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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that in many cases disclosure is important for the jury to understand the 
expert opinion.358
Perhaps in a nod in this direction, even Professor Carlson’s restrictive 
approach would still have permitted some general disclosure of the expert’s 
bases.
 
359  Without disclosure, the jury may be forced simply to choose an 
expert to defer to, with little basis for its decision.360
Moreover, even if disclosure were prohibited on direct examination, each 
party would still be entitled to fully explore the basis of the other’s expert 
on cross-examination.
  Consider a lawsuit in 
which each party hires an expert on a certain topic.  Each expert has 
probably considered the same general types of information.  As a result, if 
the experts can only disclose the general types of inadmissible information 
that they have relied on, then there may be no way for the jury to adequately 
distinguish between the experts’ direct testimony.  The plaintiff’s expert 
may testify, “I consulted sources A, B, and C, and I conclude X.”  The 
defendant’s expert may instead testify “I consulted sources A, B, and C, and 
I conclude Z.”  Based on the direct testimony of the experts the jury may 
simply be forced to choose an expert to defer to. 
361  Without a full opportunity for cross-examination, 
a party could present an expert who relied on very weak information, and 
the opponent would be helpless to expose the flaws.  Prohibiting disclosure 
of inadmissible basis evidence on direct testimony would thus prevent a 
party from laying out an expert’s reasoning for the jury, while shifting the 
explanation of the basis of the testimony to cross-examination.362
2.  The Open Approach 
 
The open approach would treat expert testimony as an exception to the 
other rules of evidence (or at least as an exception to the rule against 
hearsay) for information that is reasonably relied on by an expert.363
This approach, however, is also ultimately unacceptable, because it 
admits too much.  Consider Brennan, discussed above in Part II.B.1.  In that 
case, over the defendant’s objection, the court allowed a rehabilitation 
specialist to testify that he had reviewed the plaintiff’s medical history, and 
that two doctors had determined that the plaintiff suffered from “a 
permanent partial impairment of eleven percent of the whole body.”
  This 
approach would also solve the problem of unworkable limiting instructions, 
because the evidence would be admitted for substantive use. 
364
 
 358. See supra notes 
  The 
plaintiff thereby appears to have succeeded in presenting the testimony of 
an expert who has relied on and discloses the opinions of multiple other 
experts, effectively presenting the testimony of several experts to the jury, 
279, 284 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also supra note 327. 
 360. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 187–89, 221–27 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra Part I.B.3.b. 
 364. Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, No. CIV97-4014, 1998 WL 2017925, at *1, 
*3 (D.S.D. Sept. 17, 1998) (quoting the testimony of the specialist). 
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while having to produce (and subject to cross-examination) only one of 
them.365
If the open approach had been adopted, the medical reports relied on by 
the specialist would have been admitted (to the extent that the specialist had 
reasonably relied on them) for substantive use not only by the jury but also 
by the proponent of the expert.
 
366  The open approach could thus allow 
experts to become gateways for large amounts of evidence, forcing the jury 
to defer to the expert’s selection and evaluation of substantive evidence.367
3.  A Modified Middle Way 
 
This Note therefore advocates continuing along the compromise 
course,368 as modified in amended Rule 703.  Ten years of experience with 
the Rule demonstrates, however, that disclosure can still be expected in a 
number of cases.369  Indeed, disclosure should be expected.  In many cases, 
disclosure will be necessary to evaluate the expert.370
The approach taken by Rule 703 should be modified in its application, 
however, by a recognition of the probable ineffectiveness of limiting 
instructions for the jury, particularly when the jury cannot permissibly use 
the evidence in the same way that the expert did.
 
371  In addition, Rule 703 
as it exists now permits expert reliance on and disclosure of evidence 
rendered inadmissible not just on hearsay grounds, but also for a variety of 
other reasons.372  Expert reliance and validation may alleviate concerns that 
unreliable information may be disclosed to the jury through expert 
testimony.373  Expert reliance and validation do not, however, wash away 
potential prejudice from evidence that is inadmissible for other reasons.374  
For example, an expert may be capable of ignoring the prejudicial effects of 
a subsequent remedial measure that is inadmissible under Rule 407.375
The 2000 amendment to Rule 703 serves an additional function, even 
though disclosure can still occur (and even though juries may be incapable 
of following limiting instructions, at least in some circumstances).  Rule 
703 makes clear that the basis evidence can only be admitted, if at all, for 
the evaluative—not substantive—use.  Even if a jury cannot make the 
distinction, the idea of limited admissibility, however, is not restricted to 
  But 
if a court allows the expert to disclose such information to the jury, it 
potentially frustrates the policy goals of Rule 407.  Accordingly, courts 
should take care to apply the presumption against disclosure in Rule 703, 
with particular care to note when a limiting instruction will not be effective. 
 
 365. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra Part I.B.3.c. 
 369. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 370. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 371. See supra notes 128–41 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 373. See supra Part I.B.3.b. 
 374. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
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the jury.  It also affects the actions of the parties and the court.376  The 
proponent of the expert cannot argue that she has proved a fact by pointing 
to inadmissible evidence that the expert relied on in forming an opinion.377  
In addition, consider the example of Wolling, which is discussed in Part 
II.B.2.  During deliberations, the jury in Wolling asked to review the 
medical records upon which the expert had relied.378  The judge refused the 
jury’s request, and explained that the expert had only described the medical 
records to support his opinions.379  If the open approach had been adopted, 
the medical records would have been admitted into evidence for the 
substantive use that the jury requested.  By applying the limited 
admissibility approach in Wolling, the district court permitted the proponent 
of the expert to be clear that the expert had some basis for his opinion, but 
the court also kept prejudicial records from the jury room.380
The balancing approach of Rule 703, however modified, will not solve 
the problem of expert reliance on testimonial hearsay, which is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
B.  Unacceptable Disclosure 
Rule 703’s current approach confuses the problem of expert reliance on 
testimonial statements, by suggesting that an expert can disclose the 
testimonial statements to the jury for a non-hearsay use.  If both Rule 703 
and the Supreme Court’s dictum in Crawford are taken at face value, 
otherwise inadmissible statements are disclosed under Rule 703 only for 
non-hearsay purposes, meaning that the Confrontation Clause is not 
implicated.381  As commentators on both sides of the disclosure debate382 
and the New York Court of Appeals383 have correctly recognized, however, 
if an expert relies upon an out of court statement for its truth, jurors cannot 
possibly use the statement to evaluate the expert’s opinion unless they also 
use it for the truth.384  In addition, if they accept the expert’s opinion, they 
implicitly accept the evidence used to reach it.385
Evaluating whether the expert has offered an independent opinion, which 
is suggested as a possible approach in Justice Sotomayor’s Bullcoming 
concurrence and in several Circuit Courts of Appeals’ decisions,
 
386 partially 
sidesteps the problem of testimonial hearsay.  Courts are right to be wary of 
experts who serve as mere transmitters of hearsay.387
 
 376. See supra notes 
  In addition, if an 
119–22 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text. 
 378. United States v. Wolling, 223 F. App’x 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
 381. See supra notes 310–14 and accompanying text. 
 382. See supra Part II.B.3.a–b. 
 383. See supra Part II.C.2.  At least the jury accepts the basis evidence underlying the 
opinion in the aggregate; they need not endorse each individual item of evidence. 
 384. See People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–34 (N.Y. 2005). 
 385. See id. 
 386. See supra Part II.C.1, II.C.3. 
 387. See supra Part II.C.3. 
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expert offers only an independent opinion without conveying the substance 
of any testimonial statement, there may be no Confrontation Clause 
concerns.388
But an expert can provide an independent opinion and convey otherwise 
inadmissible evidence to the jury.  Indeed, that is the very situation that 
Rule 703 addresses, and it was the situation encountered in Goldstein
 
389 
and in Leeson.390  A psychiatrist, for example, can offer an opinion about a 
defendant’s sanity, and convey hearsay to the jury in support of the opinion.  
The hypothetical proposed by Justice Sotoymayor in Bullcoming appears to 
be another such situation.391  If an expert provides his own opinion, and 
discusses another expert’s testimonial report in support of his opinion,392
Thus, although the Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause 
decisions did not “do away with Federal Rule of Evidence 703,”
 
the expert is both providing his independent opinion and conveying 
testimonial hearsay to the jury.  In these circumstances, the disclosure of 
testimonial hearsay basis evidence should be recognized as a Confrontation 




compromises struck by Rule 703 should not be allowed to provide a route 
for testimonial hearsay to reach the jury. 
Rule 703 was amended in 2000 after a long debate on the proper 
treatment of inadmissible evidence relied on by experts in forming their 
opinions.  Ten years of experience with the amended Rule demonstrates 
that disclosure of otherwise inadmissible evidence can still be expected in a 
substantial number of cases.  In most instances, Rule 703 should continue 
substantially as before, but with an additional judicial emphasis on the 
ineffectiveness of limiting instructions under the Rule.  In addition, even if 
disclosure of otherwise inadmissible evidence occurs, the amendment to 
Rule 703 emphasizes to the court and the parties that the evidence should 
only be used to evaluate the expert’s opinion.  In cases involving expert 
reliance on testimonial statements, the compromises struck by Rule 703 
should not be allowed to provide a route to the jury for testimonial hearsay. 
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